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Tutkimuksen tarkoitus 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää, vaikuttavatko muutokset Euroopan valtioiden luottoriski-
preemioissa paikallisten pankkien ja yritysten luottoriskiin, sekä toisin päin. Eurooppalaisten pank-
kien ja valtioiden luottoriskipreemioiden on todistettu olleen merkitsevästi yhteydessä toisiinsa 
velkakriisin aikana (Acharya et al., 2014). Tämän tutkimuksen tavoite on tutkia, ovatko hiljattain 
käyttöön otettu pankkisääntely sekä Euroopan pankkiunioni onnistuneet rikkomaan 
rahoitussektorin vakautta ja Euroopan talouksia heikentävän linkin pankkien ja valtioiden välillä. 
Lisäksi tutkin, onko samankaltainen yhteys olemassa myös valtioiden ja rahoitussektorin ulko-
puolella toimivien yritysten luottopreemioiden välillä, sillä olemassa oleva kirjallisuus on tutkinut 
tätä suhdetta niukalti.  
 
Aineisto ja tutkimusmenetelmät 
Tutkimuksen paneeliaineisto koostuu 14 eurooppalaisen valtion, 31 pankin, ja 113 rahoitusalan 
ulkopuolella toimivan yrityksen luottoriskinvaihtosopimusten (”CDS”) preemioista tammikuun 
2009 ja kesäkuun 2017 välillä. Historiallinen CDS-data on peräisin Datastreamista ja kontrolli-
muuttujat useasta eri lähteestä. Muutoksia valtioiden ja yritysten luottopreemioiden suhteessa 
tutkitaan kiinteiden vaikutusten paneeliregressiolla käyttäen päivämuutoksia CDS-preemioissa, 
kontrolloiden markkinamuutoksia sekä päivä- että yrityskohtaisia kiinteitä vaikutuksia. Otos on 
jaettu neljään jaksoon sen selvittämiseksi, onko sääntelyn parantaminen vähentänyt luottoriski-
preemioiden yhteisliikkuvuutta. Lisäksi lisään regressiomalleihin useita vuorovaikutusmuuttujia, 
testatakseni erilaisia syitä, joiden takia luottoriski voi välittyä sektorilta toiselle. 
 
Tulokset 
Tutkimuksen tulokset antavat selviä viitteitä kaksisuuntaisesta dynamiikasta valtioiden ja yritysten 
luottoriskien välillä euroalueen maissa. Muutokset valtioiden CDS preemioissa vaikuttavat 
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suuntainen vuorovaikutus rahoitussektorin ja valtioiden välillä vähenee vuoden 2014 jälkeen. 
Vaikutus muiden yritysten ja valtioiden välillä jatkuu pidempään, mutta efekti on pienempi. 
Tulokseni osoittavat, että valtioiden luottoriski vaikuttaa vahvemmin yrityksiin ja pankkeihin, 
jotka saavat todennäköisemmin taloudellista tukea valtioilta tai joiden luottoluokitus on lähellä 
valtion luottoluokituksen tasoa. Pankit, jotka pitävät taseessaan suuria määriä paikallisia valtion-
lainoja sekä pankkirahoituksesta riippuvaiset yritykset ovat myös herkempiä valtioriskin 
muutoksille. 
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1. Introduction  
“The link between sovereigns and banks is indeed loosening. Following an upswing 
during the crisis, banks now tend to hold fewer domestic government bonds. And we see 
positive developments in the price of bank bonds, which are starting to decouple from 
sovereign ratings.” – Speech by commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President for the 
Euro and Social Dialogue in May 2017 
1.1 Background and motivation  
Default risk of European governments became a topic of interest during the sovereign debt 
crisis, when it became imminent that developed countries are not immune to surges in credit 
spreads. Yields on Greek and other peripheral European countries’ debt soared to levels that 
were unseen after the foundation of the common currency. Furthermore, credit rating agencies 
dramatically downgraded the ratings of several European sovereigns after the financial crisis 
caused a recession in the nations with vulnerable banking sectors and unsustainably high debt 
levels. In the long term, such severe increases in sovereign credit risk are associated with 
periods of low output growth, financial uncertainty and even restricted access to financial 
markets (Acharya et al., 2014).  The increase in credit risk and the loss of reputation in capital 
markets can be transferred from sovereigns to the real sector, and consequently decrease access 
and availability of financing for domestic firms, and increase the cost of debt (Bedendo and 
Colla, 2015; Altavilla et al., 2017). For this reason, changes in sovereign spreads are of interest 
not only to bond investors, but also to regulators, politicians and company managers alike.  
Especially the nexus between the European banking sector and governments has received a 
great deal of attention from policy makers, scholars and the press since the sovereign debt crisis. 
Several studies have documented strong mutual dependence between local banks and 
sovereigns during and after the debt crisis – a relationship poetically named the “hazardous 
tango”, “vicious circle” or “doom loop” by researchers (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Acharya 
et al., 2014; Fratzscher and Rieth, 2015). Previous research discusses two main drivers behind 
the two-way feedback loop between banking sectors and governments (Acharya et al., 2014). 
On one hand, European banks typically hold large amounts of domestic government bonds in 
their books due to their preferential treatment within capital requirements. If the credit spreads 
of these bonds widen and their value drops considerably – like happened during the debt crisis 
– the value of banks’ bond portfolios decreases. On the other hand, investors expect 
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governments to support domestic banks and “too-big-to-fail” institutions in order to avoid 
banking crises. Thus, governments hold contingent guarantees to the domestic banking sector. 
If banks are rescued, bailouts increase the debt levels of already indebted governments, which 
reduce sovereign bond values further. Moreover, a bank bailout in one country increases the 
expectations of similar bailouts in other countries, leading to increased correlation between 
sovereign credit spreads (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). Acharya et al. (2014) were one of the 
first to define and prove the theoretical relation behind the sovereign-bank doom loop, but 
several other studies document contagion between bank and sovereign credit spreads that 
cannot be justified solely by economic fundamentals (see for example, Alter and Schüler, 2012, 
De Bruyckere et al., 2013, and Altavilla et al., 2017). 
The feedback loop is harmful for the stability of the financial sector and economic growth, and 
it increases risks of bank bailouts that consume taxpayers’ money and decrease output growth. 
For example, Navaretti et al. (2016) and IMF (2017) have declared solving the issue to be of 
key importance to the health and growth aspects of European economies. Recent regulatory 
development and the founding of the European Banking Union have aimed to break the ties 
between sovereigns and domestic banking sectors. For example, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism that is part of the European Banking Union attempts to close the link between single 
sovereigns and their banks in the monetary union by centralizing the resolution of important 
financial institutions and effectively prohibiting national support for banks. Despite recent 
changes, previous research has mainly focused on documenting the correlation between risks 
during the sovereign debt crisis and, to the best of my knowledge, no studies have so far focused 
on whether new regulation has succeeded in its purpose. In this thesis, my goal is to fill this 
research gap and study whether the changes have been able to break the link that is important 
to politicians, investors and businesses alike within the EU. 
Compared to the banking sector, distinctly less attention has been directed at the linkage of 
credit risks between non-financial companies and sovereigns, or how their relationship differs 
from the interconnection between banks and governments. Traditionally, sovereign risk has 
mostly been studied in the context of emerging countries and only very recently academic 
literature has paid attention to the transfers of credit risk in developed economies. In emerging 
countries, the possibility of currency depreciation, higher-than-expected inflation, or 
unexpected political changes are usually considered the most important factors for country risk 
for investors (Baldacci et al., 2011). These risks are distinctly lower in the European Union with 
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currency risk being negligible for countries that are part of the Eurozone. Despite this, in recent 
literature Bedendo and Colla (2015) find that after the financial crisis non-financial firms’ CDS 
spreads are affected by changes in sovereign CDS spreads, and Augustin et al. (2016) find 
increased correlation between corporate and sovereign credit premiums after the bailout on 
Greek government debt in 2011. Although these studies document co-movement in credit 
spreads, none of them focus on studying the relationship and its dynamics during a longer period 
of time and therefore, the connection and its causes are yet to be fully understood. If government 
credit risk is a determinant of corporate spreads even in developed countries, it means that 
firms’ borrowing costs are affected by country risk and companies and investors should 
consider it to be a factor in their investment decisions. Therefore, I am also interested in 
studying linkages of credit risks in the non-financial sector as well.  
The reverse side of the puzzle is whether the riskiness of local banks and corporates also affect 
the credit risk of the sovereign. In addition to sovereign-bank risk transfer, many studies 
document spillovers from banking sector to sovereign credit spreads during the debt crisis, 
although most have found that contagion from sovereigns to banks is higher than the other way 
around (Erce 2015; Frazscher and Rieth, 2015). Acharya et al. (2014) propose that an increase 
of risks in the local banking sector should raise the riskiness of the government through an 
increased possibility of public bailouts, which may corrupt the credit quality of the sovereign. 
In addition, banks’ role in economic growth through intermediate loan supply is major, 
especially in Europe (BIS, 2011). Empirically, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) show that the 
relative size and riskiness of the local banking sector are linked with higher sovereign spreads 
and Kallestrup et al. (2016) find that foreign exposures of local banks affect sovereign credit 
premiums. However, very little attention has been directed at studying whether the credit risk 
of local companies’ affects sovereign credit risk, although sovereigns also provide implicit 
support to firms that are important to the local economy or partly owned by the state. In this 
thesis, I aim to supplement previous literature by considering credit risk transfer both from local 
banks’ and from non-financial companies’ to European sovereigns.  
1.2 Research questions and contribution to literature 
In this thesis I study dynamics between sovereign and corporate credit risks using credit default 
swap spreads. More specifically, I examine whether changes in sovereign spreads significantly 
leak to changes in banking sectors’ and non-financial companies’ credit spreads and the other 
way around. I aim to fill research gaps unresolved by previous literature that mainly focuses on 
4 
  
  
 
studying contagion between European banking sector and sovereigns. My research questions 
are formulated as follows: 
1. Has the new regulation in the European Union been successful in resolving the bank-
sovereign “doom loop”, or is the two-way risk transfer still in effect? 
2. Is there a relation between the credit default spreads’ of sovereigns’ and non-financial 
in Europe?  
3. Is the risk transfer between sovereigns and companies two-sided? Hence, does corporate 
credit risk also leak to sovereign credit premiums? 
4. What are the main drivers behind the possible risk transfers, and are some firms more 
affected than others? 
There are several reasons why the bank-sovereign linkage could have shifted in the last couple 
of years. Firstly, the European Union has implemented the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive that unifies the resolution of banks in different countries and forces creditors and 
investors to bear their part of the losses before governments can bail out a distressed bank. 
Secondly, the Single Resolution Mechanism came into force in the Eurozone countries starting 
from 2016 as the second pillar of the European Banking Union. The mechanism governs the 
resolution of banks in the monetary union so that no government is individually responsible for 
the restructuring of important banks domiciled in the country. Despite these recent 
improvements in regulation, it is unclear whether they have reached their desired outcomes. A 
recent report by IMF (Global Financial Report, April 2017) argues that policy-makers have 
done too little to break the connection and it still poses a risk to the region’s financial stability. 
S&P ratings agency has stated that the “doom loop” will not be over as long as banks hold 
significant amounts of sovereign debt (S&P Global Ratings, 2016) and several politicians have 
discussed the possibility to change the current regime of assigning zero-risk weight to sovereign 
debt in capital requirements as one solution (Navaretti et al., 2016). By including a longer period 
and more countries than most previous studies, I am able to shed light on whether the 
relationship has changed after the heights of extreme credit conditions in sovereign debt crisis 
and study if the regulation has decreased correlation between credit spreads. 
Regarding my second research question, two recent studies find significant correlation between 
corporate and sovereign CDS spreads in Eurozone countries (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; 
Augustin et al., 2016). Both studies focus on a narrow time period that was characterized by the 
sovereign debt crisis. To my knowledge, no previous studies have focused on the general 
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relationship between corporate and sovereign spreads in the developed countries alone. I 
expand on this question and study if the correlation between spreads documented by previous 
studies is permanent or mostly related to the turmoil in sovereign debt markets. If the former is 
true, sovereign risk is a factor that should be taken into account by investors of corporate debt 
and by corporate executives when they decide on their firms’ funding and country of 
headquarters. However, even if the correlation between credit spreads relates only to the 
sovereign debt crisis, it is important for investors to understand that similar sovereign crises can 
affect corporate credit premiums in the future.  
Additionally, to my knowledge, few studies have considered the credit risk transfer from 
corporate credit risk to sovereign credit risk. I aim to complement the first two research 
questions by studying the two-way dynamics between corporate and sovereign credit risk and 
test whether changes banks’ or non-financial companies’ credit spreads significantly leak to 
sovereign spreads. Many studies have documented credit risk transfer from banks to states after 
bank bailouts (Acharya et al., 2014), but none have so far considered a similar relation for non-
financial firms. The possibility of large-scale bailouts to banks or other corporations may 
decrease the credit quality and debt-serving-capacity of the government, and raise costs of 
sovereign debt – costs that are in the end paid from the pocket of the taxpayer. 
Unlike previous studies, I also aim to combine these views and include both financials and non-
financials in same the analysis. I study whether changes in financial regulation have affected 
the relationship between sovereigns and banks, but I also acknowledge that the banking 
regulation may have affected the relation between sovereigns and non-financials as well. A key 
difference of this thesis compared to a large part of previous literature is also that I focus on the 
long-term transmission mechanisms behind spread changes instead of trying to catch and 
measure exact spillover effects during a certain time window. 
1.3 Findings 
To measure the linkages sovereign and corporate credit risk I use a large panel dataset of credit 
default swap spreads. My sample consists of daily CDS spreads of 31 banks, 113 non- financial 
companies and 14 sovereigns from Western Europe from January 2009 to June 2017. I mainly 
follow Acharya et al. (2014) in my methodology and control for several market variables and 
firm fixed effects in my regression analysis. I find that credit spreads of banks and sovereigns 
have been significantly correlated in the past, especially between 2010 and 2014, when a 10 
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percent daily increase in sovereign spreads translates to a 1.01 percent increase in bank spreads 
in peripheral countries, and a 0.53 percent increase elsewhere in the Eurozone. This relationship 
has weakened to insignificant after 2014. Systemically important banks are more affected than 
others, as well as banks that hold large amounts of domestic sovereign debt or have a credit 
rating close to their governments’ rating. Results are robust to different model specifications 
and controlling for changes in CDS index spreads, volatility and the bank’s own equity returns.  
The findings show important remarks to regulators and investors. It seems that increased 
regulation in the financial sector and EU-wide directives on resolution of banks have succeeded 
in decreasing the nexus between the banking sector and European governments. Although the 
new rules have not yet been tested with a large bank bailout, my results indicate that markets 
think that the direction taken by regulators is correct. To ensure that future crises do not trigger 
similar risk loops as the sovereign debt crisis did, and to decrease potential costs to taxpayers 
and investors, it is important that the dynamics of the relation are monitored in the future. My 
findings also reveal which banks are most affected by sovereign risk. Practically speaking, this 
can help investors assessing the risk of their positions of bank and sovereign bonds. 
In addition, non-financial companies’ are affected by sovereign credit risk, with a 10% daily 
increase in sovereign spreads corresponding to a 0.7% increase in corporate spreads, on 
average. Although magnitude of my results is lower, they are in line with previous studies of 
Bedendo and Colla (2015) and Augustin et al. (2016). The risk transfer from sovereigns to non-
financial firms has also diminished towards the end of the studied sample, but the decrease is 
not as distinctive as in the banking sector. Companies that are partly owned by the government, 
large in size compared to the local economy, or have a credit rating close to the sovereign rating 
are more affected than others, but I am not able to find any single variable that would determine 
which companies are affected and which are not. This is an important finding in itself, as it 
shows that sovereign risk affects the borrowing costs of non-financial companies even in 
developed markets, where the “traditional” country risks of currency depreciation or 
unexpectedly high inflation are small. In addition, the results hold for a period of almost 10 
years even when several market and firm-specific factors are controlled for. 
Moreover, my analysis documents a two-way dynamic between corporate and sovereign credit 
spreads. Sovereign CDS spreads are significantly affected by changes in local banks’ and non-
financial companies’ credit spreads and this relation is robust to several control variables. My 
results show that corporate and sovereign credit risks are interlinked, with the transfer from 
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corporate to sovereign risk actually being stronger than the other way around during some of 
the periods. After 2014 changes in banking sector spreads discontinue to affect sovereign 
spreads. Few studies have previously documented such a high correlation between the credit 
risk of non-bank local companies and governments. 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
This study has a few main limitations. First, CDS contracts are traded only for large companies 
that are able to tap international capital markets and usually have outstanding bond financing 
or a relatively high credit rating. Therefore, I am not able to study what effects changes in 
sovereign risk have on the financing costs of smaller or privately owned companies. One could 
argue, that government credit risk and domestic loan supply are actually more relevant to 
smaller firms, as they are not able to diversify their funding or operations as globally as large 
firms. Including smaller companies in the study would have required a different approach of 
measuring credit risk, so I decided to focus on publicly listed firms with more data available. 
Assuming that smaller firms should be more affected than larger companies, not including them 
in the sample may actually mean that empirical results downplay the size of real effects.  
Another limitation concerns the dataset. Data on CDS spreads can be noisy, because contracts 
on many corporate reference entities are not very liquid. Therefore, I had to leave several 
companies out of the final sample due to illiquid CDS prices, stale data or long gaps in the time 
series. To avoid most of the abovementioned problems, I conduct several checks and 
restrictions on the companies that I include in my dataset and I check the robustness of my 
results with a dataset of weekly changes in CDS spreads. Tests with weekly data are in line with 
the main analysis and actually show stronger results than tests with daily data. In addition, the 
availability of CDS data for some sovereigns restricted the sample to start from 2009, which 
limited my analysis to after-the-financial crisis period. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
Remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 explains important concepts, 
theoretical background and previous literature discussing interdependencies between corporate 
and sovereign credit risks. Section 3 introduces hypotheses based on the literature discussed in 
Section 2. Data, construction of variables and methodology are presented in Section 4 and 
results of empirical analysis are presented in Section 5. In addition, Section 5 presents 
robustness checks and discussion of the analysis. Finally, Section 6 presents conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
This chapter presents an overview of literature on the dynamics between the credit spreads of 
sovereigns and banking and corporate sectors. First, I explain the concept of credit risk and 
credit spreads, and the mechanics of credit default swap markets. Then, I move to the theory 
behind the bank-sovereign risk nexus in Europe, and discuss findings of previous literature. I 
also review possible channels of transmission for the bank-sovereign and corporate-sovereign 
credit risk transfers. Finally, I conclude with reasons why the relationship may have changed 
after the sovereign debt crisis. 
2.1 Determinants of corporate and sovereign credit spreads 
Credit risk, or alternatively default risk, can be defined as the risk that a borrower is unable to 
pay back promised cash flows to the lender, who then loses either the whole invested principal 
or part of promised interest rate payments. Credit risk of a borrower can be measured in different 
ways of which accounting-based credit scoring methods, such as credit ratings, have 
traditionally been the most typical. However, rating agencies are often conservative and slow 
to adjust to new information, as they prefer to keep credit ratings stable, in order to avoid 
reversing decisions within a short time (Löffler, 2015). Another way to estimate credit risk is 
to look at market-based credit spreads, which reflect investors’ current perceptions of the 
issuer’s credit quality and requirements for return. The credit spread of an asset is defined as 
the difference between the yield of a risk-free asset of the same maturity and the yield of the 
security in question. The spread consists of two parts - the expected probability of default and 
the rate of recovery in case of a default: 
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = (1 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 𝑃(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) (1) 
If either the expected probability of a default increases or the expected recovery rate decreases, 
the credit spread and required return on the asset will consequently increase. The definition of 
an event of default depends on the obligation in question and is not limited to a bankruptcy. For 
example, governments cannot go bankrupt per se, so sovereign credit spreads reflect not only 
the ability to pay, but also the willingness to pay back debt (Moody’s, 2010).  
In general, sovereign defaults in developed countries are extremely rare and sovereign credit 
spreads are generally lower than corporate credit spreads. Gennaioli et al. (2014) argue that 
sovereign defaults are most costly in countries with developed financial institutions, because a 
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government default would destroy the balance sheets of the domestic banking sector. For this 
reason, defaults should be less likely to happen in more financially developed countries. 
However, defaults and debt crises in developing economies happen rather frequently and are 
often connected to a currency crisis. For example, Argentina has defaulted on its sovereign debt 
several times in the past twenty years (Reuters, 2014).  
Several studies have researched the drivers of sovereign credit spreads. Longstaff et al. (2011) 
argue that the influence of US equity and high yield markets dominate local market variables 
as determinants of sovereign spreads in both developed and developing economies. They claim 
that global risk premiums and investment flows, rather than local economic factors, are the most 
important determinants of sovereign credit spreads and investors of sovereign credit default 
swaps largely bear global risk instead of country-specific risk premiums. Pan and Singleton 
(2008) study the term structure of CDS spreads of Korea, Mexico and Turkey. They find that 
risk premiums co-move strongly over time and are significantly related to movements in VIX 
option volatility index, the volatility of local-currency option markets and the spread between 
yields of 10-year US BB-rated industrial corporate bonds and the yield on 6-month US Treasury 
bills. Thus, even in emerging markets sovereign spreads are mostly affected by global factors. 
After the financial crisis, yield spreads on European government bonds increased dramatically 
from their pre-crisis levels. Contrary to previous discussion, Dötz and Fischer (2010) find that 
this increase was mainly due to an increase in the expected loss component and country-specific 
factors, instead of an increase in illiquidity or global risk aversion. Whether sovereign yields 
are more affected by local or global factors seems to depend on the phase of the economic cycle. 
For example, Augustin (2013) argues that the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads signals 
about the relative importance of underlying sources of credit risk. During times of high 
economic growth the slope of the term structure is usually positive which signals that spreads 
are relatively more driven by global factors, while during a recession the curve typically turns 
downward sloping and variation in spreads tends to be more driven by country-specific shocks,. 
Thus, both global factors and country fundamentals are important determinants of sovereign 
CDS spreads, but they matter at different times. 
Taking sovereign default risk and country risk into account in investment decisions is especially 
important in the international context, also for investors of corporate bonds. Bai and Wei (2012) 
study governments and companies from 30 countries internationally and find that sovereign 
risk has both a statistically and economically significant effect on corporate credit premiums. 
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They conclude that strong property rights and legal institutions weaken the impact, while the 
influence is stronger for state-owned companies. Hence, the effect of country risk on corporate 
spreads depends on the perceived riskiness of the government. 
Changes in corporate credit spreads are also affected by changes in global factors. Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) study yield spread changes of corporate bonds and find that traditional 
predictions of structural models are able to explain only one fourth of the variation in spreads. 
However, they find that the regressions residuals are highly cross-correlated, and possibly 
linked to local supply and demand and liquidity in the markets. Longstaff et al. (2005) study 
credit default swap spreads instead, and find that majority of corporate spreads consist of default 
risk instead of liquidity or taxation risk. They also discover that the non-default component of 
CDS spreads varies in time and is strongly correlated with bond-specific illiquidity and bond-
market illiquidity in general. This could indicate that especially the yields in cash-bond markets 
are affected by market-specific factors, while CDS spreads are able to more accurately measure 
the actual default risk component of the firm. 
2.2 Credit default swap markets 
In this study, I use credit default swap (“CDS”) spreads as a measure of credit risk. CDS 
contracts are standardized derivative instruments traded in over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets. 
Contacts are bilateral and settled between two parties, not traded in exchanges. Usually the 
seller (or underwriter) of the contract is a large financial institution or a hedge fund. Like most 
other OTC derivatives, CDSs entail counterparty risk meaning the risk that either of the contract 
parties may default on their obligations.  
Trading in CDSs started in the 1990’s and the market grew rapidly in the first decade of 2000’s. 
According to statistics of Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”), the gross notional amount 
of outstanding contracts almost ten-folded from 6 billion dollars to 58 billion dollars between 
2004 and 2007. During the financial crisis and after defaults of Lehman Brothers and AIG, CDS 
markets came under considerable criticism and concern by both the press and regulators. The 
market size and liquidity has decreased after the financial crisis and BIS estimated the notional 
amount of outstanding contracts to be around 10 billion US dollars at the end of 2016.1 
                                                 
1 Actual size of the CDS market is difficult to estimate because the derivatives are traded OTC. Gross notional 
value of contracts traded refers to the sum of CDSs bought across all counterparties.  
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Theoretically, buying a CDS contract is similar to buying insurance on a reference entity’s 
default. The reference entity, which can be a government, a municipality, a corporation or an 
asset-backed security, does not take part in the contract. The protection buyer pays a series of 
periodic payments to the protection seller, called a fee, a premium or a spread. The spread is 
the percentage of the notional amount that the buyer must pay to the seller annually over the 
maturity of the contract. Although the spread is measured in annual terms, payments are 
typically made quarterly. The seller, in turn, compensates the buyer in case the contract’s 
reference entity defaults, or a credit event takes place. There are two types of settlements in 
case of a credit event. In a physical settlement, the buyer delivers the defaulted asset or bond to 
the seller, who in turn pays the par value to the buyer. In a cash settlement, the seller delivers 
the difference between the par value and the market value of the asset to the buyer in cash. CDS 
contracts can be used for hedging, speculation or arbitrage and contracts trade in several 
constant maturities, with five years being the most typical one for corporate entities. Figure 1 
demonstrates the cash flows between the participants of a swap contract in more detail. 
Figure 1: Cash flows of a credit default swap  
The figure illustrates the cash flows of a typical credit default swap contract. The protection buyer pays a quarterly 
premium to the seller of the swap measured in basis points per annum called the spread. The seller in turn, makes 
a payment to the buyer only in case of a default event. The payment will be made as the difference between the 
nominal value and fair value of the insured instrument. 
 
Depending on the type of the swap, credit events that trigger a payment can be defined 
differently. For example, contracts written on sovereigns often include repudiation and 
moratorium of debt as credit events, as governments cannot go bankrupt in the sense that 
corporations can. For example, the restructuring of Greek government debt in 2012 triggered a 
credit event and an auction in the sovereign CDSs. The recovery price for the CDS settlement 
was 21.5 cents per dollar (Reuters, 2012). The most typical credit event clause for European 
corporate contracts is called “modified-modified” while “full restructuring” is the most typical 
one for sovereign contracts. These clauses are also used in the sample construction of this study. 
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I decided to use CDS spreads instead of bond yield spreads for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
CDS spreads are a more pure measure of credit risk than bond yields. In theory, a CDS spread 
should be equal to the spread of a floating-rate note above a specified risk-free rate while in 
practice, floating-rate bonds of corporate entities are rare and there are several contractual 
reasons why CDS spreads and bond yield spreads can differ in the short run. However, Blanco 
et al. (2005) and Palladini and Portes (2011), among others, have found that CDS prices usually 
lead bond yields in the price discovery process. CDSs have several other advantages over bond 
yields in an empirical setting. Corporate bonds are usually less liquid than government bonds, 
because they are typically bought with a buy-and-hold strategy and not, for example, for 
hedging purposes. Thus, their yields may include a priced liquidity premium in addition to 
measuring creditworthiness (Longstaff et al., 2005). During crisis periods, trading in bonds may 
halt completely, making them an unreliable measure of credit risk during the Eurozone debt 
crisis. This is illustrated by the study of Palladini and Portes (2011), who find evidence of an 
unusually large CDS-bond basis spread during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Corporate and government bonds trade in different maturities and with different characteristics 
related to market microstructure, which makes bond yields hard to compare objectively with 
each other. In turn, CDSs are traded in constant maturities. Finally, especially corporate bonds 
are affected by bond- and country-specific factors such as different debt covenants, coupon 
structures, issue amounts and laws of different jurisdictions. In efficient markets, these aspects 
will be priced in yields although they do not reflect the credit risk of the entity. 
2.3 Bank-sovereign feedback loop 
After the financial crisis, it became clear that debt levels of several European countries were 
unsustainably high which dramatically widened the credit spreads of over-indebted sovereigns 
between 2008 and 2009, and again in 2010. The increase in sovereign risk revealed hidden 
problems in the European banking sector, a twin crisis named “the tale of two debt overhangs” 
by Acharya et al. (2014). Firstly, several banks had significant exposures to their domestic 
government’s debt. A decline in the bonds’ market price decreased the value of bank’s asset 
portfolios, which increased risks in already highly leveraged financial sectors. Secondly, 
governments in many countries had to support domestic financial institutions by providing 
additional capital or liquidity, which in turn increased the level of government debt and credit 
spreads soared even wider.  
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Since the financial crisis, the stability of the European financial system has been of considerable 
worry to politicians and regulators for several reasons. First, Europe is much more bank-focused 
than the United States and many European banks failed to reform and clean up their balance 
sheets like the financial sector in the US did after the crisis. Secondly, European banks are often 
important creditors to their own sovereigns and the banking sector has incentives to hold large 
amounts of government bonds (Acharya et al., 2015). In the capital frameworks of Basel 
III/CRD IV, EU government bonds are allocated a zero-risk weight in the calculation of 
minimum capital requirements to risk-weighted assets, no matter which credit rating the bond 
is assigned. When yields of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt increased, the banking sector 
had incentives to increase holdings of high-yielding government bonds, as they provided both 
high returns and do not weigh on the bank’s capital. In case that the domestic government would 
default on its debt, it is likely that the local bank itself would go down in any case, which leads 
to distorted incentives to hold large amounts of domestic bonds. Acharya et al. (2015) have 
named the phenomenon the “greatest carry trade ever”. They explain bank’s behavior with the 
regulatory arbitrage described above, with general tendency of home bias in investments, and 
with suasion by domestic government to maintain asset exposures.  
In a recent study, Ongena et al. (2016) find that during the debt crisis, domestic banks were 
substantially more likely to purchase newly issued domestic debt than foreign banks, in months 
with high sovereign bond issuance. These results support the concept of “moral suasion” 
whereby sovereign entities may put pressure on their own financial sector to support the 
government by purchasing debt. Altavilla et al. (2017) provide additional evidence showing 
that especially banks that were publicly owned or recently bailed-out purchased more domestic 
debt than other banks as a response to sovereign stress. This is consistent with the concept moral 
suasion as such banks are more likely than others be under the pressure of their governments. 
In addition, Andreeva and Vlassopoulos (2016) find evidence that the pre-existing link between 
bank and sovereign credit spreads may have actually caused the affected banks to increase 
purchase amounts of domestic government bonds. Those banks’ whose credit spreads were 
most correlated with their sovereign spreads in the turn of 2011 and 2012 bought more domestic 
assets if the credit spreads on these bonds were high. This evidence also supports the concept 
of “risk shifting” behavior where banks purchase high-yielding assets while the downside risk 
is mostly borne by the bank’s creditors and taxpayers, not by its shareholders. 
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However, the loop also works the other way around. To avoid a banking crisis, governments 
are likely to serve as providers of liquidity and capital if an important bank is in financial 
trouble. Providing a large-scale bailout to the financial sector usually increases the level of 
government debt and expands the fiscal budget, consequently affecting sovereign credit risk 
and diluting the value of currently outstanding bonds. Hence, policies to bail out troubled banks 
may have reduced the risks of the banking sector partly at the expense of raising the credit risk 
of the sovereigns (Fratzscher and Rieth, 2015). Bailing out banks serves as a credit risk transfer 
between the financial sector and the real sector: as the bailout has to be funded either with 
increased taxation or with additional debt, the riskiness of the country’s economy increases as 
a whole. Contagion between sovereign risks may also occur because investors update their 
beliefs on the probability of failure after a default event. For example, Benzoni et al. (2015) 
suggest that during turbulent times, sovereign credit premiums co-move more strongly than 
what would be justified based on macroeconomic principles.  
After correlation between credit spreads increased dramatically during the European debt crisis, 
the link between sovereign and banking sector default risk has been studied extensively. 
Increased correlation and spillover during and after the euro crisis has been documented by 
several studies (Alter and Schüler, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014; Fratzher and Rieth, 2015; among 
others). Acharya et al. (2014) present a theoretical model in which banking sector credit risk is 
a determinant of sovereign credit spreads and the other way around, leading to a feedback loop. 
They also empirically study the risk nexus and find that there was no relationship between bank 
and sovereign credit spreads before first bank bailouts in Europe. During the bank bailouts in 
2008, the feedback loop became statistically and economically important: bank spreads were 
negatively correlated with sovereign spreads. While sovereign CDS spreads increased, bank 
spreads decreased. The authors explain this as a credit risk transfer from the banking sector to 
the sovereign sector. Post-bailouts, sovereign risks significantly and positively affect banking 
sector’s credit spreads (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Several other papers have studied the spillover or contagion effect between sovereign and bank 
credit spreads. Alter and Beyer (2014) define spillovers as excessive co-movement of credit 
spreads, while contagion is defined as correlation over and above what can be explained by 
fundamental factors. Alter and Schüler (2012) find that before government interventions of 
troubled banks, contagion occurs from bank spreads to sovereign spreads. However, after bank 
bailouts the direction changes, and sovereign CDS spreads increase importance over bank CDS 
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spreads. They stress that countries with large contingent liabilities to the financial sector should 
acknowledge that this might have an impact on their own financing costs. Alter and Beyer 
(2014) construct a contagion index from CDS spreads of European sovereigns and banks and 
conclude that spillovers and the likelihood of contagion increased prior to several key financial 
market events and policy interventions during a period from October 2009 to July 2012. They 
find spillover effects both from banks to sovereigns and vice versa. Using structural vector auto 
regression (VAR) models, Frazscher and Rieth (2015) study the relationship from 2003 to 2013 
and find two-way causality between shocks to sovereign and bank risk. They find that shocks 
to sovereign risk are more important in explaining bank risk than the other way around. A 100 
basis point increase in sovereign spreads raises bank spreads by 38 basis points, on average.  
Most studies find that the feedback loop is stronger from sovereigns to banks (Erce, 2015; 
Fratzscher and Rieth, 2015). For example, Erce (2015) finds that sovereign risk affects the 
financial sector more strongly than banks affect sovereigns. He studies the effect of several 
sovereign factors that affect the correlation between CDS premiums and finds that feedback 
from sovereigns to banks is greater in countries with higher debt levels and in countries where 
banks hold large amounts of their own government’s bonds. The effect is stronger in countries 
where the sovereign credit rating has been downgraded to a high yield -category. Bank-to-
sovereign feedback, on the other hand, is stronger in countries where the banking sector is larger 
and in countries with a large share of non-performing loans. This provides evidence that the 
bank-sovereign risk is transferred by distinctive channels. In the next two chapters, I focus more 
deeply on the transfer channels from bank to sovereign risk and from sovereigns to bank risk. 
2.3.1 Channels from bank to sovereign credit risk  
Firstly, banks indirectly impact government credit risk through credit supply to the real sector. 
Banks that are facing problems with solvency or liquidity may be forced or incentivized to cut 
back on lending to the real sector. In the long term, a decrease in credit supply will contract 
investments and growth in the economy as a whole, causing a decrease in the tax base and in 
tax revenue to the government. If the government is already heavily indebted, a decrease in 
taxes can cause financial problems and increase the credit risk of the state (BIS, 2011). Thus, 
the credit supply channel may increase the governments’ credit risk even if the country does 
not suffer a banking crisis. 
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Secondly, because of the importance of the banking sector to the health of the economy, large 
financial institutions usually hold both explicit guarantees, such as deposit insurance, and 
implicit guarantees from the government, meaning that it is likely that the state will support a 
bank in financial difficulties. Systemically important, large banks are often deemed to be “too 
big to fail” that means that their failure would significantly increase the risk of a severe banking 
crisis and possibly a recession. Therefore, it is in the interests of the government to avoid 
failures and keep the financial sector as stable as possible even if it means providing support in 
a crisis and eroding the country’s own financial status. For this reason, banks may have 
incentives to seek growth through mergers or acquisitions, as bank size can imply lower 
financing costs due to the “too-big-to-fail” status (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  
During the financial crisis, banks were granted liquidity injections and recapitalizations and in 
in several cases a government even bought a significant equity stake in a systemic financial 
institution, both in Europe and in the US. For example, more than 200 banks in 16 advanced 
economies issued government-guaranteed bonds (BIS, 2011). Consequently, if investors expect 
that the government will bail out troubled banks these expectations may leak out from the 
private sector to governments as a perception of higher sovereign credit risk (Dieckmann and 
Plank, 2012). For example, Acharya et al. (2014) document that after the Irish government 
announced that it would guarantee deposits in its biggest banks, the CDS rate of the banks fell 
dramatically while simultaneously the spreads of Ireland’s sovereign CDS increased. 
Empirically, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) show that the relative size of the local banking sector 
pre-financial crisis is a determinant of sovereign CDS spreads. They find that higher exposure 
to the financial sector is linked with higher sovereign spreads after controlling for the country’s 
debt level and general market volatility. The health of the local banking sector is also associated 
with sovereign CDS spread levels. If the country’s economy was strongly dependent on the 
financial sector before the crisis, its CDS spreads show tighter correlation with the state of the 
banks’ financial health and this effect is further emphasized for countries that are part of the 
monetary union. The results support the hypothesis that an increase in the possibility of a 
banking sector bailout decreases sovereign creditworthiness, as markets incorporate the 
expected costs of the bailout to sovereign spreads. 
Kallestrup et al. (2016) show that the size and riskiness of foreign asset holdings of the domestic 
banking sector significantly affect not only the credit premiums of the banks, but also sovereign 
CDS spreads. They measure exposures of the local banking system using CDS premiums and 
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expected default frequencies of the local stock market, weighted with banks’ exposures to 
foreign and domestic private and sovereign sector. One standard deviation change in the risk 
weighted measure changes sovereign spreads by 24 basis points on average. The risk of the 
local banking system is an important determinant of sovereign CDS spreads even after 
controlling for global CDS indices and local fiscal measures. The researchers argue that the 
transmission effect is due to implicit government guarantees and contingent liabilities to the 
banking system. Also Bekooij et al. (2016) find that implicit contingent guarantees, measured 
as the size of the country’s banking sector’s equity cushion, are significantly linked to higher 
correlation between bank and sovereign spreads.  
Ahmed et al. (2015) find somewhat contradicting evidence on the assumption of implicit 
guarantees to too-big-to-fail institutions. They show that while there is a difference between the 
borrowing costs of large and small financial firms, this effect is not unique to the banking sector 
but is also observed with non-financial firms. This contradicts with the hypotheses that the size 
effect between credit spreads of large and small banks is due to increased expectations of 
implicit government guarantees to “too-big-to-fail” banks. However, they also find that banks 
have, on average, lower borrowing costs than non-financial companies do, when other company 
characteristics are controlled for.  
2.3.2 Channels from sovereign to bank credit risk 
BIS (2011) defines four channels through which sovereign risk feeds back to the banking sector: 
through devaluation of banks’ sovereign bond holdings, deterioration in funding conditions due 
to collateral damage, credit rating ceiling and through decreased value of implicit and explicit 
guarantees from governments. Recent literature has found empirical evidence on all of the 
distinctive channels, which I review next. 
The most direct way changes in government credit premiums affect banks is through holdings 
of sovereign bonds, the so-called asset value channel. European banks have traditionally held 
large amounts of sovereign bonds and institutions are often overexposed to their home country 
(BIS, 2011). In addition, many banks have large exposures to the debt of other Eurozone 
sovereigns, for example German and French banks held sizeable holdings of “GIIPS”2 
                                                 
2 The acronym “GIIPS” refers to the peripheral EU-countries that were especially affected by the sovereign debt 
crisis. GIIPS refers to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The alternative spelling, sometimes used by the 
press is “PIIGS”. In this study, I use the acronym GIIPS to refer to the five peripheral countries. 
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countries’ debt before the sovereign debt crisis. When the credit risk of a sovereign increases, 
the fair value of their outstanding debt decreases, consequently weakening asset values in the 
financial sector’s balance sheet. The impact is direct for bonds that are “held-for-trading” and 
valued at fair values, and somewhat slower for bonds held at amortized cost3.  
Asset value channel is the most typically cited reason as a cause of the sovereign-bank feedback 
loop. Among the first to research it were De Bruyckere et al. (2013) who study excess 
correlation between bank and sovereign CDS spreads and variables that contribute to the 
correlation. They find that banks with higher exposure to sovereign bonds experience, on 
average, much higher excess correlation with the corresponding countries’ credit spreads. 
Correlation is also stronger the higher the sovereign credit spread. The researchers conclude 
that government bond holdings are relevant only if the risk of sovereign default increases, while 
decreases in credit risk do not have significant impact on the excess correlation. This supports 
the hypothesis that the observed excess correlation is due to the asset holdings channel. Both 
Acharya et al. (2014) and Erce (2015) find evidence that sovereign-to-bank feedback is higher 
for banks that hold large amounts of government bonds.  
The second channel is through deterioration in short-term funding conditions, so-called 
collateral channel. Government securities are often used as collateral in interbank loans, 
repurchase agreements and wholesale funding from the central bank (BIS, 2011). If the market 
values of bonds deteriorate, value of this collateral will shrink. According to BIS (2011) 
especially private repo markets are sensitive to changes in collateral value. As the repo markets 
are an important source of bank funding, sourcing financing from the capital markets becomes 
more expensive. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) provide evidence that banks relying excessively on 
interbank funding are more vulnerable to contagion than banks funding their operations mainly 
with traditional deposits. They also show that banks holding higher amounts of sovereign bonds 
are more vulnerable to changes in sovereign credit risk and the effect is even stronger for those 
relying extensively on short-term funding.  
Thirdly, sovereign risk transmits through the sovereign rating channel. Traditionally, credit 
rating agencies have required that a company’s credit rating cannot exceed the rating of its 
                                                 
3 According to accounting rules, banks can value holdings of debt in two ways: at fair value or at amortized cost. 
If the bonds are “held-for-trading” or “available for sale” they are valued in the books at fair value, and drops in 
market prices directly affect asset valuations and profit-and-loss statements. If bonds are “held-to-maturity”, for 
example to strengthen the balance sheet, they can be valued at amortized cost. For these holdings, the book value 
will only decrease if holdings are impaired, i.e. when a default on the bond is deemed to be likely. 
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sovereign. More generally, a common expectation is that private sector claims cannot be offered 
at better terms or lower spreads than those of the local government. According to Almeida et 
al. (2017), rating agencies have been moving away from the rating requirement in the past few 
years, but it is still uncommon for a company to have a higher rating than its government. A 
lower rating makes financing more expensive because investors require higher credit premiums 
for taking the risk. Therefore, a credit rating downgrade will increase the financing costs of the 
bank. Alsakka et al. (2014) find that changes in sovereign credit ratings strongly increase the 
possibility of bank rating downgrades. They find no evidence before the sovereign debt crisis, 
but the effect increases strongly after the crisis. Because of the implicit credit rating ceiling, a 
decrease in government rating thus increases the risk that the bank rating will also be 
downgraded in the near future.  
In addition, a downgrade on sovereign debt affects banks through financial sector regulation, 
especially if the downgrade is near to a speculative rating class. Aretzki et al. (2011) find that 
sovereign rating downgrades significantly affect bank stock prices between 2007 and 2010 and 
downgrades near the speculative grade had systematic spillover effects to the financial sector. 
They argue that this effect is due to rating-based triggers in bank regulation, OTC derivatives 
contracts and different investment mandates. Adelino and Ferreira (2016) show that, after a 
sovereign downgrade, banks with ratings bound by the sovereign ceiling reduce their lending 
significantly more than similar banks whose ratings are not at the sovereign bound. Decreases 
in sovereign ratings also affect the market value of the government’s outstanding debt, which 
is deemed to be riskier than before. This affects the banking sector through the two previously 
described channels, devaluation of assets and collateral. In case the downgrade results in a move 
from investment grade -class to high yield the effects are even more pronounced, as in most 
cases only investment grade securities are accepted as collateral in interbank markets. 
Finally, government guarantee channel discussed in Part 2.3.1 also works the other way around 
by channeling government credit risk to the banking sector. Contingent guarantees lower banks’ 
costs of funding as investors expect that governments will rescue banks in case of severe 
problems. If the sovereign’s own creditworthiness deteriorates, however, the value and 
credibility of these guarantees decreases because it becomes less likely that the government will 
be able to support its financial sector. Acharya et al. (2014) argue that the value of government 
guarantees decreases quickly especially if the state is highly indebted because of the difficulty 
to source new funding from the capital markets. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) 
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argue that some banks may have actually become “too big to save” in the past few years. During 
the financial crisis doubts arose whether governments’ have the financial abilities to save their 
largest financial institutions. The researchers find that bank valuation is negatively related to 
bank size and positively related to their headquarter country’s fiscal balance. The researchers 
suggest that systemically important banks could actually increase their value by downsizing.  
This figure demonstrates the feedback loop between sovereign and banking sector credit risks, also called the 
“doom loop” (Acharya et al., 2014). Sovereign risk affects banks through their holdings of government bonds, 
availability of funding and credibility and value of offered guarantees. Banks affect sovereign risks through the 
implicit guarantees and possibility of bail-outs and through banks’ general importance to the real economy. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the feedback loop between the sovereign and the banking sector: both 
are affected by general economic environment and their own and each other’s credit ratings. 
Bank credit risk affects sovereigns’ through contingent guarantees, and in the long term, 
through credit supply to the economy. Sovereigns, in turn, affect banks through holdings of 
government bonds, value of collateral and the credibility and value of government guarantees. 
 
2.4 Corporate and sovereign credit risk beyond the banking sector 
Compared to the banking sector, it is less evident why an industrial corporation’s credit spreads 
should be affected by the credit risk of its sovereign or the other way around. If a government 
defaults on its debt, it does not necessarily mean that companies’ financial figures deteriorate 
or that the risk of a corporate default increases. This is especially true for companies operating 
in open, developed market economies like the European Union. Most companies in the free-
trade area are able to move their operations to another country and the largest are able to tap 
Figure 2: Sovereign-bank feedback loop 
Sovereign Banking sector 
Sovereign debt holdings 
Availability of funding 
Credibility of bank guarantees 
Implicit and explicit guarantees to banks 
Credit supply to real sector 
Credit ratings 
Economic environment 
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global capital markets for financing. In addition, risks typical for emerging economies such as 
currency controls or expropriation of private assets are extremely unlikely in Western Europe. 
Countries that are part of the monetary union are not able to print money in order to deflate 
their debt either. Thus, the risk of currency depreciation of corporate bonds is also very small. 
Likewise, if a non-financial company ends up in bankruptcy, it is less likely to cause a large 
systemic crisis in the economy as the failure of an important bank. Compared to the banking 
sector, the spillover from corporate risk to sovereign risk should therefore intuitively be smaller. 
Despite this, recent studies find significant correlation between corporate and sovereign credit 
spreads in Eurozone countries within the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Augustin et al. 
(2016) study spillovers of credit risk from sovereigns to non-financial corporations before and 
after the bailout of Greek debt in April 2010. They find that a ten percent increase in sovereign 
spreads increases corporate spreads by 1.1 percent after the bailout, while the relation was 
statistically insignificant before the event. The spillover is more pronounced for companies 
from the Eurozone and from the GIIPS countries. Bedendo and Colla (2015) study the 
corporate-sovereign credit risk relation from January 2008 to December 2011 and find a 
somewhat smaller effect. A ten percent increase in sovereign CDS spread is associated with a 
0.5 percent change in corporate spreads. Klein and Stellner (2014), in turn, focus on bond yield 
spreads in the Eurozone and find that corporate credit ratings and bond Z-spreads are affected 
by sovereign ratings and Z-spreads. In the next chapters, I review literature on the channels that 
may transfer sovereign credit risk to corporations’ and the other way around. 
2.4.1 Channels from corporate to sovereign credit risk 
Most previous research focuses on the effect of sovereign risk to corporate credit spreads, but 
corporate risk may also affect sovereign creditworthiness. In aggregate, riskiness of the 
country’s corporate sector affects the volatility of GDP and imports – for example, some 
industries may be very important to the GDP growth and tax revenue of a certain sovereign. If 
a single corporation is very important to employment or GDP growth, it may itself affect the 
riskiness of the country as well (BIS, 2011). Secondly, in addition to the banking sector 
governments hold different implicit contingent guarantees to corporations that have a “too-big-
to-fail” status or are otherwise of importance to the state. Thus, if a company is very important 
to the country in terms of employment or tax revenues, a large decrease in the firm’s credit risk 
may indirectly affect the state through the economy, and directly through increased likelihood 
that the company may require financial support from the government. Governments may also 
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bail out a company to prevent socioeconomic problems and unemployment, or to control power 
over natural resources or national security. Although examples of state-support to non-financial 
corporations are rarer than for banks, one example of a well-known corporate bailout is the 
automotive sector and in the United States after the financial crisis. In addition to full on 
bailouts, sovereigns may also back corporate debt. For instance, energy sector companies in 
Europe are often partly owned by the state and thus the government effectively backs their debt. 
2.4.2 Channels from sovereign to corporate credit risk 
Bedendo and Colla (2015) identify three distinct channels through which sovereign credit risk 
may leak out to corporate credit risk in developed economies. Firstly, a strong decrease in 
sovereign creditworthiness may lead to a contraction in domestic demand both through 
increases in taxation and tightening in fiscal policy. Secondly, like banks, some companies 
enjoy guarantees, backed debt and credit lines from the government. Thirdly, the state of the 
local banking sector affects domestic credit conditions. An increase in sovereign credit risk may 
lead banks to contract their credit supply to the real sector, causing higher costs of financing or 
even difficulties in obtaining credit in the first place. Additionally Augustin et al. (2016) suggest 
that the credit rating channel is an important mechanism in the context of non-financial firms 
as well. Next, I will go through evidence on four channels in more detail. 
Increased sovereign credit risk can be a consequence of high debt levels, budget deficit or low 
economic growth. To restore creditworthiness, governments often need to decrease spending 
and adopt restrictive fiscal policy measures. Restrictive policy measures directly affect 
revenues of companies that supply goods and services to the public sector, including for 
example utilities or transportation sectors. Budget deficits may also lead to increases in taxation, 
which affects profitability directly through corporate taxes and indirectly due to a contraction 
in domestic demand that slows down economic growth and incentives to invest in general. This 
increases the default risk of companies whose sales that are highly concentrated in the domestic 
markets. For example, Bedendo and Colla (2015) and Klein and Stellner (2014) find that firms 
with sales concentrated on the domestic market are significantly affected by sovereign credit 
spreads. On the contrary, Bai and Wei (2012) argue that the taxation channel is less emphasized 
in countries with stronger institutions, as the government is not able to change the taxation 
system surprisingly at its discretion.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, non-financial companies may also enjoy implicit or 
explicit guarantees from the state. Guarantees are especially relevant for companies where the 
government is an important shareholder or where the state otherwise holds significant influence 
on including, for instance, companies operating in telecommunications or utilities, where 
investments are typically state-supported financially for different strategic reasons. Like for 
banks, government guarantees for non-financial firms may come in the form of debt guarantees 
or promises of support in times of financial stress. Faccio et al. (2006) study 450 firms from 35 
countries and find that firms that have political connections are significantly more likely to be 
bailed out than similar firms with no political connections. Interestingly, politically connected 
firms also borrow more than others do, indicating that lenders are more willing to extend credit 
to firms with a higher probability of a future bailout.  
If the government is under financial distress, these guarantees lose credibility and value, which 
affects the creditworthiness of supported companies. Bedendo and Colla (2015) find high 
correlation between credit risk of sovereigns and firms that are under significant government 
influence and Augustin et al. (2016) find that spreads of firms with public ownership have 
higher correlation than others with sovereign spreads. Bai and Wei (2012) study the sovereign-
to-corporate credit spreads in an international context and find that the relationship is stronger 
for companies that are owned by the state. Klein and Stellner (2014) find that bond Z-spreads 
of government-owned companies or those that operate in transportation, utilities or 
telecommunications are more affected by sovereign credit risk. 
Thirdly, European economies have traditionally relied strongly on banks and the importance of 
capital markets has been minor. Thus, if banks are suffering and contracting their credit supply 
in the economy, companies that finance a large part of their operations with bank loans may 
need to reduce investment, which decreases future growth and profitability. In the longer term, 
this erodes the creditworthiness of affected companies. Both Augustin et al. (2016) and 
Bedendo and Colla (2015) find that the credit risk of firms that are dependent on bank financing 
are more affected by changes in sovereign spreads. Besides bank lending, deterioration of 
sovereign creditworthiness affects companies that source financing from the capital markets. 
Most importantly, a sovereign default lowers the country’s reputation among investors, but 
already increased uncertainty about commitment to serving debt may restrict access to bond 
markets (Augustin et. al., 2016). For example, Arteta and Hale (2008) show in the context of 
emerging economies that sovereign debt crises are usually accompanied with a decline of 
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foreign credit and lending to private firms. Altavilla et al. (2017) find evidence that when 
sovereign risks increased, banks from stressed countries with large sovereign bond exposures 
cut their lending more than less-exposed banks.  
In a recent study Acharya et al. (2016) study the effects of the sovereign crisis in the context of 
syndicated loan markets. They find firm-level evidence that banking sector’s lending 
contraction decreased investments, job creation and sales growth for the firms that were 
affiliated with banks from countries that were most affected by the sovereign debt crisis. 
Between 2008 and 2013, the volume of newly issued syndicated loans fell by 82%, 66% and 
45% in Ireland, Spain and Portugal correspondingly, and the effect was strongest for banks with 
high exposures to sovereign risk.  
The fourth channel how credit risk of the sovereign affects the pricing of corporate credit risk 
is through the previously discussed sovereign rating ceiling. Firms rarely have credit ratings 
higher than their sovereign, and in case of a sovereign downgrade, the perceived 
creditworthiness and funding costs of the firm are therefore also under pressure. Almeida et al. 
(2017) study the effect of sovereign downgrades on firms’ credit ratings. They divide firms to 
“bound firms” which have a rating equal to, or above, their sovereigns’ and “non-bound firms” 
which have a lower rating. They find that after a sovereign downgrade, bound firms are 
significantly more likely to be downgraded as well and the downgrade affects the firm’s 
investment decisions and net debt issuance. Economically, the effect on investment decisions 
is significant: bound firms decrease investment by 8.9 percent in the year of the downgrade and 
are also more likely to reduce net debt issuance. Credit rating is an important determinant of 
access to bond financing and if there are doubts that the firm will be downgraded, sourcing new 
debt may become more difficult. In addition, Almeida et al. (2017) find that downgrades 
increase the yields of bound firms’ more than those of non-bound firms’. Three months after 
the sovereign downgrade, the average yield on bound firms’ bonds increased 34 basis points 
more than those of non-bound firms’. 
Drago and Gallo (2017) find supporting evidence on the importance of sovereign downgrades 
on the context of European syndicated loan spreads. They discover that downgrades 
significantly increase costs of debt, while an upgrade does not have a significant effect. 
Investment grade -firms are most affected, but downgrade significantly affects also the firms 
that are most dependent on bank financing. Interestingly, they find that downgrades also affect 
the lending costs of unrated firms. They argue that unrated companies have fewer opportunities 
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to source funding from capital markets and thus, have to rely on bank loans. Importantly, the 
study suggests that increases of sovereign credit risk have direct effects on the lending costs of 
non-financial corporations.  
However, the sovereign ceiling does not relate to credit ratings alone, but also to financing 
terms in general. Companies are often not able to secure any financing at better terms than their 
government (Borensztein et al., 2013). Lee et al. (2016) research sovereign ceiling on private 
sector firms in the context of CDS spreads in developed and developing countries. They find 
that compared to other firms in the same country, companies that have important foreign asset 
holdings or whose shares are dual-listed in a country with better property rights or stricter 
disclosure requirements, are more likely to have lower CDS spreads than their governments. 
Their finding suggests that it is possible for firms to break the link to sovereign risk if they are 
internationally diversified.  
In conclusion, there is plenty of evidence supporting the credit rating channel, both for banks 
and for non-financial firms. Previous literature discusses the linkages between non-financial 
firms’ and sovereigns’ but clear proof of links between credit risks are still scarcer than for the 
financial sector. 
2.5 The European Banking Union – an end to the doom loop?  
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis several regulatory changes have taken place in the 
European Union with the aim of resolving the unwanted link between the fragile banking 
sectors and their sovereigns and to stabilize the financial systems. In this chapter, I discuss and 
explain the recent policy developments and their possible effects to the credit risk transfers to 
and from European sovereigns. 
The EU-wide Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (hereafter “the BRRD”) was adopted in 
spring 2014. The directive requires banks to prepare recovery plans and grants national 
authorities the powers to ensure resolution with minimal costs to taxpayers through setting 
minimum requirements for banks’ own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) that are based on 
bank size and risk. The idea is that bank shareholders and creditors instead of taxpayers will 
have to pay a share of the costs through a “bail-in” mechanism. In addition, the directive 
includes requirements of national resolution funds. The aim has been to reduce moral hazard 
by setting the burden of bank failures on investors instead of taxpayers and to harmonize the 
resolution of financial institutions’ throughout Europe (European Commission). In addition, the 
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directive targets to decrease the likelihood of government bailouts with taxpayers money, which 
should decrease the importance of contingent government guarantees to bank credit spreads. 
Secondly, the decision on the European Banking Union was initiated in 2012 as a policy 
reaction to the bank-sovereign circle. The banking union consists of three pillars: the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”), the Single Resolution Mechanism (“SRM”) and the Joint 
Deposit Insurance, which are legislated by the so-called Single Rulebook. As of 2018, the first 
two pillars have been implemented in countries that are part of the monetary union. The deposit 
insurance has not been fully decided on due to open questions on who is going to provide the 
funds to and how the insurance should be implemented in several EU countries.  
The first part of the banking union, The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been in 
effect since 2014. From November 4th, 2014, the ECB has centrally conducted the stress testing 
and supervision of the most important financial institutions in the Eurozone. Before the SSM, 
supervision was performed on a country level by local authorities. The aims of the mechanism 
have been to make bank balance sheets more transparent and to align the stress testing 
conducted across the monetary union, directly assessing the problem of asymmetric information 
from an investor point of view, and avoiding regulatory arbitrage. However, the SSM does not 
in itself aim to weaken the link between governments and banks. The second part of the union, 
The Single Resolution Mechanism (“SRM”) came into force from the start of 2016 through the 
BRRD directive. The purpose of the SRM has been to ensure that resolution of failing banks is 
done orderly and to limit resolution costs to taxpayers and to financial stability. Authority that 
makes decisions in the SRM is called the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and financing of the 
restructuring is done through a common Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is controlled by 
the SRB. The SRM directly targets to break the link between banks and sovereigns by ensuring 
that no bank can have preferential treatment by their government and that no government is 
solely responsible for saving a failing bank. Thus, if the mechanism works as it should it should 
reduce the costs of a bank failure to a single sovereign and break the guarantee channel within 
the bank-sovereign feedback loop. 
Although the banking union and the BRRD have mostly received positive feedback that they 
are guiding EU-wide banking regulation to the right direction, several critics have voiced that 
the “too-big-to-fail” problem and bank-sovereign feedback loop are still yet to be solved. In 
addition, some critics argue that a “bail-in” may work in case of an isolated bank failure, but 
letting banks fail is never optimal in a systemic banking crisis (Financial Times, 7.1.2018). 
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Another often discussed initiative would be to change the treatment of EU government debt in 
bank capital requirements by tightening the rules and introducing limits to the size of sovereign 
exposures (Navaretti et al., 2016). Despite the extensive discussion, such changes to capital 
requirements are yet to be made. 
So far, there is very little academic research on the success of the regulation. One of the few is 
Neuberg et al. (2016), who research whether the market-implied probability of a bank bail-in 
has increased after the BRRD was implemented. Bail-in can be defined as an action where 
creditors suffer the losses of a bank failure, but the bank stays in business afterwards. In other 
words, the bank does not go bankrupt but continues to operate. The researchers find that after 
2014 the likelihood of a bank default has increased, while the likelihood of a bail-in has fallen 
and the likelihood of a government bailout has not increased in succession. The researchers 
interpret the evidence to signal that policymakers have succeeded in reducing market 
expectations of government support to troubled banks. The BRRD requires that a minimum of 
eight percent of bank’s liabilities need to be bailed in before a government can come to the 
rescue. Thus, the likelihood of government support has decreased, and holders of junior-
seniority debt would almost never be bailed out under the directive. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis that BRRD has at least partly succeeded in its aims and market participants estimate 
the likelihood of government-support is lower than before the BRRD regulation. In addition, 
Vergote (2016) studies bank-sovereign correlation between years 2007 and 2015 and concludes 
that some financial institutions still seem to be “too-big-to-fail” and their resolution plans lack 
credibility. However, so far there is no conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of the 
regulation. 
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3. Hypotheses  
In this chapter, I present the hypotheses of the study based on previously discussed literature 
and recent developments. Numerous studies have proved excess correlation and feedback loop 
between European governments’ and banking sectors’ credit spreads during and after the 
sovereign debt crisis (Alter and Schüler, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014; Kallestrup et al., 2016). 
However, several regulatory changes and improvements have taken place since the bailout on 
Greek debt in 2010, including the founding of the European Banking Union and application of 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The aim of the BRRD has been to integrate 
resolution mechanisms inside the EU countries, forcing investors to take the first hit before 
government bailouts. This should have theoretically decreased the expectations that a sovereign 
will bail out its local financial sector in times of a banking crisis. In addition, implementation 
of the Single Resolution Mechanism that is part of the Banking Union should have significantly 
reduced the risk that taxpayers from a single country will be held liable for the failure of a 
domestic bank. Nevertheless, very little academic research has been done to test the success of 
the regulation. I aim to study whether the bank-sovereign feedback loop has changed during the 
past few years and meanwhile test the effectiveness of new regulation4: 
Hypothesis 1: Direct link from sovereign to bank credit spreads has existed after the sovereign 
debt crisis, but this relation has diminished after the BRRD and SRM have been implemented. 
I study four sub-hypotheses related to the distinctive channels of risk transmission between 
sovereigns and banks discussed in chapter 2.3. Firstly, I expect that banks holding large 
amounts of domestic sovereign bonds are more exposed to changes in sovereign credit risk due 
to the asset holdings channel (BIS, 2011). 
Hypothesis 2: The link from sovereign to bank credit risk is stronger for some banks than for 
others. 
                                                 
4 The BRRD has been implemented by all members of the European Union as of 7th of January 2016, with 
exception of Poland, not included in this study. However, only banks domiciled in the EMU countries are under 
the SRM. For this reason, it is possible that only banks from the Eurozone are fully affected by the new regulation. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that investors see the banking sectors in other countries are less risky after the new 
regulation has been put in place. Therefore, I test the relationship both on the EU-level and with subsamples of 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. I am also interested in seeing whether the effect is stronger in the GIIPS 
countries, where previous studies have found a stronger feedback loop. 
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Hypothesis 2A: The transmission from sovereign credit risk is stronger for banks 
with higher holdings of domestic sovereign bonds (“asset-holdings channel”). 
Secondly, banks hold implicit and explicit guarantees from their home states (BIS, 2011). The 
more important these guarantees are, the stronger I expect the feedback loop from sovereign 
risk to bank risk to be. I test this hypothesis in two ways. Firstly, if the bank is expected to 
benefit from government support, it will be more affected by changes in sovereign 
creditworthiness. This expected benefit is measured using Moody’s credit ratings. Secondly, if 
the financial institution in question is deemed to be a globally systemically important 
institution, it is more likely that the government will implement emergency measures if the 
bank ends up in financial trouble, as the risk of a banking crisis increases with the importance 
and size of the bank. 
Hypothesis 2B: The transmission from sovereign credit risk is higher for banks 
that benefit from government support, or are deemed to be of systemic importance 
(“guarantee channel”).  
Thirdly, I test the effect of the credit rating channel. If the credit rating of a bank is equal to, or 
above, than its sovereigns’ rating I expect it to be more affected by downward changes in 
sovereign spreads due to the rating ceiling documented by Alsakka et al. (2014).  
Hypothesis 2C: The transmission from sovereign credit risk is stronger for banks 
with a rating closer to their sovereign (“credit rating channel”).  
In line with hypothesis one, I am interested in testing the three parts of hypothesis two over 
time to see whether the channels have become negligible after the implementation of the BRRD 
and SRM. Especially the effects of the guarantee channel should have decreased if market 
participants estimate that the BRRD has diminished the probability of government bailouts. Out 
of the four transmission channels described in Chapter 2, I do not test for the collateral channel 
(BIS, 2011), as I do not have exact information of the collateral posed by banks against their 
trades. 
My second research question relates to the relationship between non-financial companies’ and 
sovereign credit risk. I formulate my hypothesis based on previous literature which shows that 
increases in sovereign credit risk feeds back to the real sector, although the magnitude of the 
relationship is lower than it is for banks (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Augustin et al., 2016). I am 
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interested in testing whether the previous results hold for a longer period and during periods 
that are not characterized by stressed financial markets. This aspect has been uncovered by 
previous empirical research. My hypothesis is that credit spreads of non-financial companies’ 
are affected by credit spreads of their governments’. 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate credit spreads are affected by sovereign credit spreads of their 
country of domicile.  
Chapter 2 discussed four channels through which sovereign credit risk can be channeled to the 
real sector. Based on this discussion, I formulate four hypotheses to test if these factors have a 
significant effect on the magnitude of the relationship. Firstly, in times of sovereign distress, 
the credit risk of the domestic banking sector tends to increase (Alter and Schüler, 2012; 
Acharya et al., 2014), which can cause a decrease in credit supply to the real sector (Acharya 
et al., 2016). Thus, companies that are more dependent on bank financing may find it more 
difficult than before to source funding, causing an increase in financing costs.  
Hypothesis 4: The link from sovereign to corporate and risk is stronger for some companies 
than for others. 
Hypothesis 4A: The link from sovereign to corporate credit risk is stronger for 
companies that are highly dependent on bank financing (“bank channel”). 
Secondly, companies that enjoy implicit or explicit guarantees from the government are 
expected to be more affected by changes in sovereign credit risk, because the value of these 
guarantees is affected by sovereign creditworthiness (Bedendo and Colla, 2015). I expect that 
government-controlled companies or firms otherwise enjoying state support are more affected 
by sovereign credit risk than others.  
Hypothesis 4B: The link from sovereign to corporate credit risk is stronger for 
companies that are controlled by, or otherwise important to, the state (“guarantee 
channel”). 
According to the theory on sovereign rating ceilings, the credit quality of a firm is bound by the 
credit rating or credit spreads of its sovereign. Firms with a rating close to, or equal to, that of 
their home country, are more affected in case of a sovereign downgrade (Almeida et al., 2017; 
Drago and Gallo, 2017).  
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Hypothesis 4C: The link is stronger for companies that have a credit rating equal 
to, or above, their sovereign (“credit rating channel”). 
Lastly, significant distress to sovereign creditworthiness can result in a decrease of domestic 
demand if the government is expected to increase taxation, decrease public investment or state 
demand for goods and services. I expect that firms which source a higher portion of their 
revenue from their domestic market are more affected by changes in sovereign spreads than 
firms that collect revenue more globally. 
Hypothesis 4D: The link is stronger for companies that source a large part of 
their revenue from the domestic market (“revenue channel”). 
Finally, my third research question asks whether the relation between corporate and sovereign 
credit risk is two-sided and sovereigns are also affected by the credit spreads of local companies. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the dynamic is two-sided and the credit risk of banks’ and non-
financial companies’ also affects sovereign credit spreads through contingent guarantees and 
their importance to the health of the economy. However, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, I expect 
that the link from banks to sovereigns has diminished after the new EU-wide regulation on bank 
resolution has been put in place. 
Hypothesis 5: Sovereign credit spreads are affected by spreads of local companies and banks, 
leading to a two-way dynamic between the sectors. Bank to sovereign credit risk transfer has 
diminished after the BRRD and SRM have been put in place in Europe. 
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4. Data and methodology 
In this section I describe the data sample of CDS spreads and other variables used in the 
analysis. I also illustrate how control variables are constructed and present summary statistics 
of my sample. Finally, I present and discuss the methodology and regression models used to 
study hypotheses developed in the previous section. 
4.1 Data   
CDS spread data is obtained from Datastream for both sovereigns and corporates. I include 
corporate entities headquartered in one of the Eurozone countries, in Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. I use Datastream to search for banks and non-financial 
companies that are headquartered in the abovementioned countries and have a traded credit 
default swap. I exclude all non-bank financial companies and European subsidiaries of 
companies that are headquartered elsewhere. In addition, I require that all entities have their 
shares listed in a stock exchange in a sample country and further exclude companies that have 
been merged or delisted during the study period. Further, companies included in the dataset 
need to have a traded CDS and equity for the whole period. Eight Eurozone sovereigns5 were 
left out of the analysis due to a lack of liquid CDS data for the study period. Greece is also 
excluded due to restrictions in the country’s CDS after the bailout on its debt. 
From Datastream I retrieve mid-quote CDS spreads with a daily frequency from 1.1.2009 to 
30.6.2017. I use senior unsecured contracts with a 5-year maturity, as this is the most liquid 
contract maturity especially for corporate entities, and the most typical CDS maturity to be 
studied in financial literature. All contracts are traded in either in euros or in US dollars: almost 
all of the corporate and bank contracts are traded in euros, as well as all sovereign CDSs with 
the exception of contracts on Finland, the Netherlands and Norway which are traded in dollars. 
The sovereign contracts trade with a Full Restructuring -clause while corporate contracts are 
traded with a Modified-modified restructuring (MMR) –clause. These are the most typical 
clauses for European sovereign and corporate contracts correspondingly.  
In line with Acharya et al. (2014), I use daily CDS spreads to ensure a large sample and to make 
it easier to control for daily variation in other variables. The alternative would have been to use 
weekly changes in spreads, which is the approach taken by, for example, Bedendo and Colla 
                                                 
5 These are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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(2015). I address this question in the robustness checks in Chapter 5.6. The downside of using 
daily data is that daily changes in CDS spreads tend to be noisy, because some contracts’ 
illiquidity. To ensure that results are not driven by unavailable CDS quotes or measurement 
error, I restrict the sample to entities that have a traded CDS for the whole period with several 
data checks. Firstly, I exclude CDS series for firms that are missing more than 15% of daily 
spreads for the studied period. In addition, I drop observations with longer than two days of 
zero changes in the CDS to avoid stale data, and I exclude one entity that filed for bankruptcy 
during the study period. Because I do not exclude all entities with missing data, but instead drop 
time series observations, I end up with an unbalanced panel with 67,489 observations for banks, 
245,920 observations for non-financials and 30,426 observations for sovereigns. 
In addition to CDS spreads, I collect data of country- and company-specific factors. I obtain 
quarterly government debt and GDP data from OECD’s statistics and balance sheet information 
for firms from Thomson One and Orbis. From Thomson One, I fetch financial statement data 
at annual frequency for total assets, long- and short-term debt, book equity, deposits (for banks) 
and S&P long-term issuer credit ratings. In addition, I collect two types of Moody’s issuer credit 
ratings, long-term issuer ratings and baseline credit assessment (BCA) ratings, which measure 
the creditworthiness of a bank before expected external support. Because some data is not 
available in Thomson One, I collect data on bank loans, the share of each firm’s revenues from 
the domestic country and the percentage of firm’s shares owned by the local government from 
Orbis. There are some entities where Orbis data is unavailable, and these entities are left out of 
part of the analyses. I fetch data on the market capitalization of each of the studied countries 
from Bloomberg and data on banking sector’s assets from the ECB’s statistical warehouse. In 
addition, I hand-collect data of banks’ holdings of government bonds from the transparency 
tests of the European Banking Authority. The bank-level holdings of sovereign debt are publicly 
available for 30 banks with half-a-year frequency from 2010 to 2017.  
For control variables, I fetch daily data of credit default swap index, equity market volatility 
and local stock index returns, 5-year US Treasury yields and exchange rates against the US 
dollar from Bloomberg. For CDS market returns, I use iTraxx Europe Investment Grade index 
that tracks the movements in CDS premiums of 125 European investment grade corporates. To 
control for aggregate market volatility, I use the VSTOXX index, which tracks the index option 
volatility of the Euro STOXX 50 equity index, and is similar to the well-known VIX index for 
S&P 500. For equity index returns in each country I use the local total return index. 
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4.2 Variables and descriptive statistics 
The dependent variable in the study is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the relevant 
CDS spread of a bank, a firm or a sovereign. The independent variable of interest is the daily 
change in either the logarithm of the sovereign CDS spread, or an index of firm CDS spreads 
from the relevant country. Construction of the CDS spread indices is described in the next 
chapter. Variables that are used to study hypotheses 2 and 4 will be explained next. Variable 
descriptions and data used to construct them are also presented in Appendix 1. 
First, I measure banks’ sovereign bond holdings by two ratios, which are calculated at the end 
of each semi-annual period for which the bond holdings data is available: 
 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 =
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
 (2) 
 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
 (3) 
where i denominates the bank and t the six-month period for which the ratio is measured. Based 
on the ratios I create two dummy variables, which I use to divide the sample in half according 
to sovereign exposures. Variable Domestic exposure is equal to one if the ratio of domestic 
bond holdings to total assets is higher than the sample median at the end of each half-year period 
and zero otherwise: 
 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = {
1   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 > 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑡
0   𝑖𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑡
. (4) 
Similarly, Home share is equal to one if the ratio of domestic bond holdings to total sovereign 
bond holdings is higher than the sample median at the end of a semi-annual period. I construct 
many other dummy variables in a similar manner by comparing the firm-specific value of a 
variable to the sample median at time t.  
For Hypothesis 2B I create two variables. The first variable is based on the credit ratings of 
rating agency Moody’s. Moody’s assigns financial institutions two types of ratings, with and 
without government support (Moody’s Investor Services, 2014). The Baseline Credit 
Assessment (hereafter “BCA”) rating represents the bank’ intrinsic, or standalone, probability 
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of failure before taking into account any possible external support that the bank may receive. 
This rating is solely based on bank’s financial situation and business positioning. However, to 
rate the bank as an issuer of debt, Moody’s also takes into account the possibility that the bank 
may receive public support, which usually increases the bank’s creditworthiness through 
expected government guarantees. Assessment of probability and extent of government support 
is included in the bank’s Issuer Credit Rating6. The BCA is always either equal to, or lower, 
than the Issuer Credit Rating, as the expected government support cannot be “negative”. Thus, 
the difference between the two ratings acts as a proxy for the likelihood that Moody’s expects 
the bank to benefit from government guarantees, and a higher difference indicates a higher 
probability of support (Acharya et al., 2014). I construct a variable Ratings uplift that takes the 
value of one if the bank’s BCA rating is lower than the Issuer rating and the bank is hence 
expected to benefit from government support. Each rating is first assigned a numerical score 
from 1 to 26, so that the highest rating Aaa is assigned a score of 1 and the lowest is assigned a 
score of 26. If the issuer rating score is lower than the BCA rating score, Moody’s assesses that 
the bank benefits from government support: 
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 𝐵𝐶𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡
0     𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 𝐵𝐶𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 
. (5) 
The variable is re-measured annually. The second variable, Systemic importance is a dummy 
that takes the value of one if the bank is deemed to be a global systematically important bank 
(“G-SIB”) by the Financial Stability Board. The bank sample includes 13 systematically 
important financial institutions in total.  
To test the effect of the credit rating ceiling, I create a variable called Rating ceiling, that is 
equal to one if the bank’s or firm’s S&P Long Term Issuer Rating is equal to, or higher than, 
the rating of its sovereign and zero otherwise. Similarly as before, each S&P rating is first 
assigned a score from 1 to 26, so that the highest rating gets a score of 1. If the firm’s rating 
score is lower than or equal to that of the sovereign, its creditworthiness is deemed to be higher, 
and variable Rating ceiling is equal to one: 
                                                 
6 The extent of support is assessed by looking at the probability of support, the state’s capacity to provide support 
and general dependence between the support provider (the state) and support recipient (the bank), among others 
(Moody’s Investor Services, 2014). 
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 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡
0     𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡  
 (6) 
where i denotes the firm from country j and t is the year of measurement for the credit rating. 
The variable is used both for banks and for non-financial companies. 8 banks and 10 non-
financial companies have a rating higher than or equal to their sovereign at some point during 
the sample period. Alternatively, I measure the sovereign ceiling in terms of credit spreads. The 
variable Spread ceiling is constructed similarly to Rating ceiling and it equals one if the CDS 
spread of the firm is higher than that of the sovereign, measured at daily level. 
For the non-financial sample, I construct a dummy variable Bank dependent to test companies’ 
dependence on the banking sector. The variable measured how large a fraction of the firm’s 
debt is in in the form of bank loans. Bank dependent is equal to one if the ratio of the firm’s 
bank loans to total liabilities is higher than the sample’s median ratio at the end of each financial 
year. In the end of 2016, the median and average shares of bank loans to total liabilities in the 
non-financial sample were 3.4 percent and 9.4 percent of total liabilities, correspondingly. 
Hence, the sample does not seem to be very dependent on bank financing. One reason may be 
that companies which have a traded CDS have good access to public bond markets. 
Alternatively, I measure dependence on bank financing based on the size of the country’s 
banking sector, which is measured as the ratio of the domestic’ banking sector’s total assets to 
the country’s total equity market capitalization at the end of each calendar year. The variable 
Bank based is a dummy variable takes the value of one if this ratio is higher than the median of 
all countries’ ratios, and zero otherwise. Thus, if Bank based is equal to one, the country is in 
the top half of the sample of European countries, measured with the size of the banking sector. 
Similarly, I measure the share of revenue that companies’ source from their country of domicile. 
Dummy variable Domestic revenue is equal to one if the ratio of the firm’s sales from the 
domestic country to its total revenue is higher than the median of the total sample. This variable 
is based on data at the end of financial year in 2016 due to lack of annual data. The median and 
average share of domestic revenues at the end of 2016 are 28.1 and 36.7 percent, respectively. 
Finally, to test the effect of government influence in the interdependence between credit 
spreads, I construct three variables. Firstly, variable Government control indicates government 
ownership and is equal to one if the local government holds more than 5% of the company’s 
shares at the end of 2016. There are in total 16 companies, where the domestic government 
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holds a significant share of ownership. However, I also acknowledge that governments may 
hold power over a company in other ways than directly owning its shares. I expect that 
companies which are strategically more important to their countries, for example in terms of 
employment or GDP contribution, are more likely to be supported by the state. I construct a 
variable called Strategic relevance which equals one if the ratio of the company’s market 
capitalization to the total equity market capitalization of the country is higher than the 75th 
percentile of the total sample at the end of each year (Bedendo and Colla, 2015). In other words, 
Strategic relevance, measures the relative size of the company compared to the total size of the 
country’s equity markets. Instead of using the median like with other dummy variables, I 
decided to use the 75th percentile, because most of the companies in the sample are quite small, 
and I expect that strategic importance measured with market cap only becomes relevant only if 
the company is substantially large. On average, the companies represent 2.6% of their country’s 
total market capitalization. Finally, I create a variable Supported sector that takes the value of 
one for firms operating in telecommunications, utilities or transportation sectors, as these 
sectors are most expected to both benefit from government guarantees and be affected by 
changes in state demand. 24 firms out of 113 operate in these four sectors. 
 
The figure illustrates the geographical distribution of number firms and banks in the sample. The grey bars 
represent the number of banks and the blue bars represent the number of non-financial firms from each country. 
Figure 3: Geographical distribution of sample firms 
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Figure 3 illustrates the geographical distribution of the sample companies and banks. The 
sample includes 14 sovereigns, 31 banks from 10 countries and 113 non-financial companies 
from 13 countries. Thus, there are 3 countries where the sample includes only a non-financial 
company but not a bank. Largest proportion of banks comes from Spain (6 banks) and largest 
number of non-financials come from the United Kingdom (31 companies) and France (25 
companies), which in total represent a total of 49.6 percent of the non-financial sample. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of banks, non-financial companies and sovereigns 
measured on 31.12.2016. Banks are considerably larger than non-financial companies when 
measured with total assets. In addition, banks have on average higher credit ratings: the median 
credit rating of the bank sample is A- and the median rating of the corporate sample is BBB. 
Banks are mostly funded with customer deposits (44%), while non-financials are mostly funded 
with equity (31%). A higher proportion of the bank sample comes from both GIIPS and 
Eurozone countries (42% and 71%, respectively) than of the non-financial sample (9% and 
61%). This is mainly due to the high number of Italian and Spanish banks in the financial 
sample. An average bank holds 10.5 % of its assets in sovereign bonds, with 40 % of those 
invested in the bonds of the home government. The holdings of domestic sovereign bonds range 
from 0.7% of total assets for Svenska Handelsbanken and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken from 
Sweden, to 9.6% for Banco de Sabadell from Spain. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the time-series for the three samples. The panel data 
sample for banks consists of 67,489 observations in total, while non-financial sample includes 
245,920 observations and sovereign sample includes 30,426 observations. The sample size was 
somewhat decreased because of missing CDS observations. I divide the sample to four 
distinctive periods. First period runs from 1.1.2009 until the bailout of Greek debt on 11.4.2010. 
The start of the period was restricted by data availability and I chose the period to end when the 
debt crisis extrapolated in the Eurozone. During this time, the average CDS premiums were 
141.7, 226.6, and 69 basis points for banks, non-financials and sovereigns, respectively. The 
second period ranges from 12.4.2010 to the date when the BRRD was implemented, 11.5.2014. 
During this period sovereign and bank CDS spreads increase, on average. The spreads of non-
financial companies’ decrease. On the third period, from 12.5.2014 to 31.12.2015 all of the 
CDS spreads and their standard deviations are at their lowest. Finally, the last period runs from 
the date when the Single Resolution Mechanism came into force, 1.1.2016, until the end of the 
sample in 30.6.2017. During this period the average CDS spreads increase again for all entities.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  
This table reports the summary statistics of European banks, non-financial companies and sovereigns included 
in the study for a cross-section on December 31st, 2016. Assets and Equity are measured in billions of euros. 
Equity (%), long-term debt (%), short-term debt (%) and deposits (%) present relative proportions of firm’s 
total assets. Credit rating is S&P Foreign Currency Long-Term Issuer rating coded into numerical values such 
that AAA/Aaa is equal to 1 and D is equal to 26. Ratings uplift is the difference between Moody’s long-term 
issuer rating and baseline credit assessment rating (BCA) where ratings are coded to numerical values. 
Systemically important equals one if the bank is deemed to be a Global Systemically Important Bank. Bank 
loans to liabilities is the percentage of bank loans divided by total liabilities and Domestic revenue is the 
percentage of revenue sourced from the domicile country divided by total revenue. Government controlled 
takes the value of one if the local government owns more than 5% of the company’s shares. Strategic relevance 
is the ratio of the company’s market capitalization to the total market capitalization of the country. Supported 
sector is equal to one if the firm operates in telecommunications, utilities or transportation. GIIPS and Eurozone 
indicate the percentage of the sample headquartered in the GIIPS (Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain) or Eurozone 
countries, respectively. Debt-to-GDP is total government gross debt divided by GDP and Banking Sector 
assets/Equity Market is the ratio of local banking sector’s total assets to the equity market capitalization of the 
country. Data sources: Thomson ONE, Orbis, ECB, OECD, and Bloomberg. 
  
Obs. Average SD Median 
25th 
 percentile 
75th 
 percentile 
Panel A: Banks             
Assets (billion euros) 31 692.4 612.1 497.9 199.4 1102.7 
Equity (billion euros) 31 39.0 36.4 25.2 12.50 59.04 
Equity (%) 31 6.3% 2.0% 5.8% 5.1% 7.0% 
Long-term debt (%) 31 15.0% 10.5% 11.2% 7.5% 19.4% 
Short-term debt (%) 31 13.1% 7.0% 10.7% 7.8% 18.0% 
Deposits (%) 31 44.4% 14.2% 46.6% 33.9% 56.9% 
Credit rating 29 7.4 2.4 7.0   
Ratings uplift 29 2.3 1.4 2.0   
Domestic bonds/Assets (%) 30 4.2% 3.0% 3.6% 1.5% 7.2% 
Home share (%) 30 40.1% 20.9% 35.9% 21.2% 58.0% 
Systemically important (%) 31 43.3%     
GIIPS (%) 31 41.9%     
Eurozone (%) 31 71.0%         
Panel B: Non-financials             
Assets (billion euros) 113 50.7 69.8 26.7 9.3 54.1 
Equity (%) 113 31.1% 17.0% 31.0% 19.9% 43.2% 
Long-term debt (%) 113 23.2% 11.5% 21.5% 16.1% 30.3% 
Short-term debt (%) 113 5.1% 5.3% 3.9% 1.8% 6.5% 
Credit rating 98 8.8 2.5 9.0   
Bank loans to liabilities (%) 107 9.4% 14.4% 3.4%   
Domestic revenue (%) 93 36.7% 28.1% 29.2% 13.3% 54.5% 
Government controlled (%) 108 14.8%     
Strategic relevance (%) 107 2.6% 3.2% 1.3% 0.5% 3.2% 
Supported sector (%) 109 21.1%     
GIIPS (%) 113 8.8%     
Eurozone (%) 113 61.9%         
Panel C: Sovereigns       
Debt to GDP (%) 14 85.2% 32.2% 81.9%   
Banking sector assets /  
     Equity market  
13 4.89x 2.61x 4.10x 2.95x 6.04x 
Credit rating 14 2.2 1.9 1.0   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of CDS spreads 
 
 
Figure 4 shows historical development of CDS spreads for studied sovereigns, and the median 
CDS spreads of the country’s banks and corporates. In the long term, corporate CDS spreads 
move in line with the sovereign spreads. Credit spreads are significantly higher between 2011 
and 2013, and decrease again towards the end of the period. The median bank spreads are on 
average higher than spreads of non-financials, especially during the period when CDS spreads 
are high for all entities. In most countries, sovereign and corporate spread levels move close to 
each other but there are exceptions. For instance, in Finland median corporate CDS spread is 
higher than the sovereign CDS spread for the whole period. Co-movement between credit 
spreads seems to be the tightest in GIIPS countries. In some countries, for example in United 
Kingdom and Italy, the sovereign CDS spread is actually higher than the median corporate 
spread for part of the period. This shows that corporate credit spreads are not necessarily bound 
by the credit quality of the government.   
This table reports the average and median CDS spreads and daily changes in the spreads for European banks, 
non-financial companies and sovereigns. “Total” refers to a time period from 1.1.2009 to 30.6.2017, Period 1 
from 1.1.2009 to 11.4.2010, Period 2 from 12.4.2010 to 11.5.2014, Period 3 from 12.5.2014 to 31.12.2015 and 
Period 4 from 1.1.2016 to 30.6.2017. Daily changes are percentage-changes in the CDS spread of the company 
or sovereign. Source: Datastream. 
 
  
No. of 
observations 
Average 
CDS spread 
(bps) 
Standard 
deviation 
Median CDS 
spread (bps) 
Mean daily 
change (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Panel A: Banks             
Period 1 9,966 141.68 84.30 117.00 -0.021 % 3.715 % 
Period 2 32,520 265.43 257.73 182.13 0.055 % 3.450 % 
Period 3 13,099 93.49 54.41 79.27 0.035 % 3.131 % 
Period 4 11,904 118.01 80.26 97.52 -0.065 % 3.702 % 
Total  67,489 187.72 201.33 130.00 0.019 % 3.478 % 
Panel B: Non-financials   
Period 1 36,531 226.61 382.19 106.50 -0.308 % 3.173 % 
Period 2 118,311 166.25 172.26 106.58 0.016 % 2.670 % 
Period 3 47,686 89.84 75.96 66.61 0.008 % 2.249 % 
Period 4 43,392 103.99 112.44 75.36 -0.076 % 2.267 % 
Total 245,920 149.41 203.46 90.13 -0.652 % 2.612 % 
Panel C: Sovereigns 
Period 1 4,458 69.03 49.18 56.00 -0.042 % 4.911 % 
Period 2 14,679 133.08 191.26 55.98 0.055 % 4.816 % 
Period 3 5,913 37.76 38.35 21.24 0.061 % 5.016 % 
Period 4 5,376 43.88 52.37 23.45 0.107 % 5.674 % 
Total 30,426 89.41 143.66 38.80 0.005 % 5.030 % 
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Figure 4: Median CDS spreads 
The graphs show the development of sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) and the median corporate CDS 
spreads of the companies headquartered in the country, from 1.1.2009 to 30.6.2017. The dark grey line represents 
the sovereign spread, the black line represents median corporate spread of domestic non-financial firms and the 
blue line represents median bank CDS spreads in basis points. Source: Datastream. 
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4.3 Methodology  
I closely follow the empirical approaches of Acharya et al. (2014) and Bedendo and Colla 
(2015) and employ fixed effects regression models to test for the relation between sovereign 
and corporate credit spreads. I include a large set of control variables in all model specifications 
to control for both market movements and for firm- and country-specific factors. According to 
Longstaff et al. (2011) credit spreads tend to increase during times of market turbulence and 
they are driven by changes in global macroeconomic factors and investor sentiment. Markets 
also price expectations of changes macroeconomic fundamentals and economic growth in 
sovereign credit spreads and these factors may affect the expected profitability and 
consequently the credit spreads of local banks and firms. It is likely that changes in these market 
variables affect both sovereign and firm credit spreads, creating correlation that is unrelated to 
the actual risk nexus that I aim to test.  
In the main model, I regress daily logarithmic changes of corporate or bank CDS spreads on 
daily logarithmic changes in sovereign CDS spreads. I follow Acharya et al. (2014) and use 
changes in CDS spreads instead of levels, because I am interested in whether changes in 
sovereign spreads cause changes in corporate spreads. In addition, Bedendo and Colla (2015) 
report that time series of CDS spread levels tend to be non-stationary. I test the stationarity of 
my CDS spread dataset with Dickey-Fuller tests that include a time trend and an intercept. The 
null hypothesis of unit root is rejected only for 84 firms out of 144 for log-levels of CDS 
spreads. Changes in CDS spreads in my sample, in turn, are always stationary. 
I include time fixed effects at the daily level in all model specifications to control for daily 
changes in global market fundamentals. In addition, I control for bank- and firm-level 
heterogeneity by including firm fixed effects, which capture company-level heterogeneity. In 
line with existing literature (Acharya et al., 2014, Bedendo and Colla, 2015) I prefer using a 
fixed effects model instead of adding a set of macroeconomic and firm control variables in 
order to avoid any omitted variable problems. In addition, I control for general market-wide 
variation in European CDS spreads and equity markets by including firm-level interactions on 
log-changes in two market indices. I use iTraxx Europe CDS index to capture market-level 
changes in corporate credit default swaps and VSTOXX index to capture changes in the market-
level volatility. Market-level changes in the CDS spreads may be due to liquidity or other 
market specific shocks that do not directly relate to the correlation between sovereigns and 
firms.  
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I test hypotheses 1 and 3 with the following regression models: 
 ∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (7) 
where ∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the change in the natural logarithm of the CDS spread (in bps) of 
a bank or firm i, from country j, from day t-1 to day t. ∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) is the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of the CDS spread of a sovereign j. 𝛿𝑡 denotes time (day) fixed 
effects. The alternative model specification is: 
 
∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 
𝛾1∆ log(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡) 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾2∆ log(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(8) 
where I add firm-level fixed effects, denoted by 𝜑𝑖, and control variables to the regression.  
∆ log(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡) and ∆ log(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) are daily log changes in the market indices, which are 
allowed to vary at the firm level by interacting them with the firm fixed effects. In both model 
specifications the coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 which captures the effect of change in sovereign’s 
CDS to the change in the firm’s CDS spread. In addition, I follow Acharya et al. (2014) and 
estimate the regression model controlling for the firm’s equity returns: 
 
∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2∆ log(𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛾1∆ log(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡) 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾2∆ log(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(9) 
where ∆ log(𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡) is the daily change in the logarithm of the firm’s equity price. Controlling 
for company’s own equity return allows me to control for any remaining omitted variables that 
could be related to changes in the company’s financial status. Controlling for the equity returns 
is relevant especially for banks, since most bank bailout schemes aim at supporting the 
company’s debtholders instead of its shareholders (Acharya et al., 2014). Therefore, all 
company-specific events that do not relate to debtholders should be caught by changes in the 
equity returns. I expect that equity returns are negatively (positively) correlated with increases 
(decreases) in corporate CDS spreads, as increases in credit spreads and decreases in equity 
prices can both signal of weakening financial status.  
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To test hypotheses 2 and 4 I include additional dummy variables to the regression model to 
capture changes that may be explained by the channel mechanisms. The dummy variables are 
interacted with the main dependent variable, the log-change in the sovereign CDS: 
 
∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑖 ∗ ∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡)) + 
𝛽1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2∆ log(𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾1∆ log(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡) 𝜑𝑖
+ 𝛾2∆ log(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡)𝜑𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(10) 
where variable 𝐷𝑖 is the dummy variable that is different for each sub-hypothesis. Here, the 
coefficient of interest is on the interaction term, 𝛽3 that captures the variation for firms 
belonging to group 𝐷𝑖. 
For Hypothesis 5, I create two credit spread indices to measure local banks’ and firms’ and non- 
effect on sovereign credit spreads. The credit risk indices are determined separately for banks 
and for non-financials as follows: 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ∑(𝑤𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) (11) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 are weights determined according to the total assets of a firm i from country j to the 
total assets of all firms in the sample from country j. The created indices act as dependent 
variables in the regression model for H5. I also add additional variables suggested by previous 
literature to control for country- and market-level changes that may have an effect in sovereign 
spreads. The regression model for H5 is as follows: 
 
∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾1∆ log(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡) 𝜑𝑗 
+𝛾2∆ log(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) 𝜑𝑗 + 𝛾3∆ log(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝛾4∆ log(𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡) 
+𝛾5∆ log(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡) 𝜑𝑗 + 𝛾6(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(12) 
where ∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡) is the daily change in the logarithm of the weighted CDS spread of 
the country’s banks or non-financials.  In addition to market variables defined previously, I 
control for changes in the local stock index with variable ∆ log(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡), change in 
5-year US Treasury yields with ∆ log(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡), changes in the currency rate against 
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US dollar with ∆ log(𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡), and the country’s quarterly ratio of government debt to GDP 
with 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑗. The control variables are based on previous studies of Longstaff et al. (2011) 
and Dieckmann and Plank (2012). I leave out part of the control variables the previous 
researchers have used, as I study daily changes instead of levels and most macroeconomic 
variables are updated only quarterly or annually. However, I expect that the country- and day-
fixed effects will capture most of the variation in economic variables between countries. 
A possible problem when using cross-sectional time-series data is heteroskedasticity of error 
terms. To control for this effect, I cluster all standard errors at the firm level (at the country 
level when the dependent variable is the change in sovereign spreads). An alternative would 
have been to cluster standard errors at the country level to ensure that standard errors are not 
affected by between-country heterogeneity. I additionally estimate the models by clustering 
errors at the country level, but all of the results stay effectively unchanged.  
As a robustness check, I add lags of the main variables in regression models (6) and (9) to 
control for the possibility that changes in firm or sovereign CDS spreads are affected by past 
changes in CDS spreads. Including lagged variables controls for possible endogeneity due to 
dynamic nature between the dependent and independent variables (Bedendo and Colla, 2014; 
Erce, 2015). As documented by Nickell (1981) least squares estimates of dynamic panel models 
are biased in cases of “large N and small T” samples, because the demeaning process creates 
correlation between estimated regressors and the error term. In my sample, the time dimension 
(“T”) is remarkably large compared to the number of firms (“N”), and the bias becomes 
negligible (see similar approach taken by Bedendo and Colla, 2014). I estimate the following 
dynamic models with least squares dependent variables (LSDV): 
 
∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝜔1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1) 
+𝜔2∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 ∗ 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(13) 
 
∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡) + 𝜔1∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1) 
+𝜔2∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 ∗ 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(14) 
where ∆ log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1) is one-day lag of firm/bank CDS spread and ∆ log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1) 
is one-day lag in sovereign spread, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 include control variables specified for previous 
models. 
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5. Empirical results 
This section presents the findings of my empirical tests based on the discussed methodology 
and data. I go through the empirical results for each hypothesis, first separately for the bank 
sample, then for the non-financial sample and finally for sovereigns. In addition, I conduct 
additional checks to ensure robustness of my results. Lastly, I discuss the findings and their 
impact on future policy choices and firm financing decisions. 
5.1 Credit risk transfer from sovereigns to banks 
In this section, I analyze the regression results for hypotheses one and two which concern the 
relation between CDS spread changes of European banking sectors and sovereigns.  
To test whether the relation has changed after regulatory improvements, I first divide the sample 
into four sub-periods. I use the same regression models in each period to see if the significance 
of the relation changes in time. The first time period runs from 1.1.2009 until the bailout on 
Greek government debt on 11.4.2010. This period is characterized by decreasing credit spreads, 
after the worst part of the financial crisis and bank bailouts is over. The second period runs from 
12.4.2010 until the date when the BRRD regulation was announced to be effective, 11.5.2014. 
During this period, we see a strong increase in sovereign and bank credit spreads. The third 
period runs from 12.5.2014 until 31.12.2015, and the final period starts from the date when the 
SRM was implemented 1.1.2016, and runs until the end of the sample to 30.6.2017. The SSM 
was implemented during Period 3. H1 predicts that the relation between sovereign and bank 
spreads diminishes after period two or possibly after period three when the SRM is introduced.  
Figure 5 presents correlations between banking sector’s CDS spreads and sovereign CDS 
spreads in each country in the four sub-periods. Correlation coefficients between CDS spreads 
are generally high and close to 0.80 in most of the countries during periods 1 and 2. However, 
period 3 starting from May 2014 shows a clearly different pattern. During this period, 
correlations between bank and sovereign spreads are negative in Austria, France, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden. In all countries the correlations are clearly lower in the third period. 
During period 4 correlations mostly return to their previous levels. In general, correlations are 
lowest for banks from Germany and the United Kingdom and highest for Spain and Italy, where 
the correlation coefficients during the total study period are higher than 0.90. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, something clearly happens to the relation between sovereign and banking sector 
spreads in period 3.  
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Figure 5: Correlations between bank and sovereign spreads by country 
This figure shows the pairwise correlations between sovereign CDS spreads and median CDS spreads for the 
country’s banks. Period 1 in blue ranges from 1.1.2009 to 11.4.2010, Period 2 in light grey from 12.4.2010 to 
11.4.2014, Period 3 in dark grey from 12.4.2014 to 31.12.2015 and Period 4 in dashed from 1.1.2016 until 
30.6.2017. Source: Datastream. 
 
5.1.1 Effects of bank regulation to sovereign-bank transfer 
In this chapter, I analyze regression results for Hypothesis 1 and in the next sub-chapter I will 
focus more on the transmission channels and test Hypothesis 2. Regression results for model 
specifications (7) and (8) are presented in Table 3. Specification marked with (1) includes day 
fixed effects and specification marked with (2) adds bank fixed effects and their interactions 
with changes in the CDS index and market volatility. In all models standard errors are clustered 
at the bank level. From the first two columns it can be seen that the main dependent variable, 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS), is significant at the 1% level for the total period with a coefficient of 
0.016 when both bank and time fixed effects are included. Bank CDS spreads are significantly 
affected by changes in sovereign spreads. The effect is economically rather small: a ten percent 
daily increase in home sovereigns’ CDS spread increases log bank CDS spread by 0.16 %, on 
average. The results are similar in both model specifications, but including bank fixed effects 
and control variables increases the adjusted R2 of from 0.40 to 0.46.  
There are interesting differences between the sub-periods. During first two periods variable 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is statistically significant but the significance disappears in the last two 
periods. In period 3, the coefficient on Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is actually negative, although 
statistically insignificant. The main dependent variable is most highly significant during second 
period and the coefficient increases from 0.023 to 0.037 from the first period to the second.
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Table 3: Sovereign-to-bank risk transfer 
 
  
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regressions where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread, ΔLog 
(Bank CDS). ΔLog (Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. ΔLog (EQ) is the daily change in the natural 
logarithm of the bank’s equity price. All regressions control for day fixed effects. Specifications (2) and (3) control for bank fixed effects and include interactions of bank fixed 
effects with the logarithm of daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not 
shown in the table. 
 
Total 
(1/2009 – 6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 6/2017) 
Δlog  
(Bank CDS) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Δlog  
(Sovereign CDS) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.030** 
(0.014) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Δlog(EQ)   
-0.050*** 
(0.008) 
  -0.045*** 
(0.011) 
  -0.045*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.064*** 
(0.014) 
  -0.084*** 
(0.018) 
Control variables NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 67,489 67,489 67,489 9,966 9,966 9,966 32,520 32,520 32,520 13,099 13,099 13,099 11,904 11,904 11,904 
No of banks 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.455 0.456 0.439 0.475 0.477 0.455 0.510 0.511 0.314 0.382 0.383 0.338 0.420 0.445 
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Economically, the effect is also strongest during the second period: ceteris paribus, a 10% 
increase in sovereign CDS spread increases log bank CDS by 37 basis points. The evidence 
supports Hypothesis 1, as it indicates that the relation between bank and sovereign credit 
spreads has diminished since the implementation of the BRRD and the SRM. 
Table 3 also shows regression results for model (9) (marked in the table with number (3)), 
which adds banks’ own equity returns as a control variable. As expected, the coefficient on 
equity returns is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all periods. An increase 
in equity price correlates with a decrease in bank credit spreads, which is expected as higher 
equity value signals of expectations of increased profitability or growth. On average, a 10 
percent increase in the equity price decreases log of CDS spread by 0.5 percent. Including 
equity returns in the regression model controls for daily variation in the banks’ fundamentals 
and future expectations, which bank fixed effects may not capture. However, things that solely 
affect debtholders but not equity owners – such as contingent debt-bailout guarantees from the 
government – are not controlled for. Including bank equity returns increases the adjusted R2 of 
the models, but has no effect on the main results. ΔLog(Sovereign CDS) stays significant during 
periods 1 and 2 and in the total time sample. Hence, changes in sovereign spreads significantly 
affect bank CDS spreads over and above the effects that the government’s creditworthiness may 
have on the bank’s market value. These variations should be captured by changes in the bank’s 
equity price, which further confirms the impact sovereign risk has to banks’ credit risk. 
Period 2 is considerably longer than the other sub-periods. To ensure that the results are not 
driven by a single significant year, I conduct the same regressions for annual subsamples. 
Results are presented in Appendix 2. There are clear differences between different years, but 
effects are mostly in line with those presented in Table 3. Changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
significantly explain changes in bank CDS spreads between years 2009 and 2013, after which 
the relation becomes insignificant. This is in line with the periods specified in the main 
regressions. The relation is most significant in years 2011 and 2013, when a 10% daily increase 
in sovereign spread corresponds to a 0.45% increase in bank spread, on average. Banks’ equity 
returns are significant in explaining spread changes in all of the years except for 2012 and 2015.   
Based on the analysis I cannot reject Hypothesis 1 and conclude that a significant link between 
bank and sovereign credit spreads has existed, but has weakened after new banking sector 
regulation has been put in place in Europe. Results for the first periods are in line with Acharya 
et al. (2014), who study co-movement between bank and sovereign spreads from 2007 to 2011. 
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However, the magnitude of the results in Table 3 is lower than of Acharya et al (2014). They 
find that during a period from 22.10.2008 to 30.4.2011 a 10% increase in sovereign CDS 
translates to a 0.9% increase in bank CDS (or 0.7% when equity returns are controlled for). The 
difference in magnitude of the effect may be due to a longer study period or differences in the 
sample of banks7. Interestingly, Acharya et al. (2014) found a negative and significant relation 
between CDS spreads during a period of bank bailouts during 2008, which they explain as a 
transfer of credit risk from the banking sector to sovereign creditworthiness. Hence, by bailing 
out banks governments effectively transferred some of the banking sector’s credit risk to their 
own. The negative relation changes to positive after the bailout period, during which the results 
are similar to those of the first period in my sample.  
Results presented in Table 3 and in Figure 5 add new and meaningful evidence to previous 
literature by proving that bank and sovereign credit spreads have been linked even after the 
sovereign debt crisis. The relation diminishes after 2014.  This proves that either the banking 
regulation has been able to reach its goals and break the link between sovereigns and banks, or 
that the sovereign-bank risk feedback is something that is only observed during times of 
economic turbulence. The latter explanation is questionable though, as for example in the start 
of 2016 bank credit spreads widened substantially due to fears of Deutsche Bank failure (VOX 
News, 2016) and this turbulence in the markets did not have a meaningful effect in the relation 
between sovereign and banking sector spreads. 
Moreover, I test if there are differences between banks from Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
countries, and banks from the GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries by interacting the main 
dependent variable with a dummy that takes the value of one if the bank is domiciled in one of 
the GIIPS countries or in the Eurozone, but not in the GIIPS countries. Results are presented in 
Table 4. Interaction of with an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank is 
domiciled in a GIIPS country, is statistically significant for the total sample and for the second 
period. Similarly, interaction with Non-GIIPS Eurozone, an indicator variable for other 
Eurozone countries, is strongly significant in period 2, but insignificant in other years. Main 
variable Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is statistically insignificant when it measures the effects of 
spread changes only for banks outside of Eurozone.  
                                                 
7 I had to leave some of the banks Acharya et al. (2014) sample out of my analyses due to unavailable data for the 
longer period. In addition, Acharya et al. (2014) included Greek banks in their tests, which I decided to exclude 
due to illiquidity and trading restrictions in the CDS of the Hellenic Republic. 
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Table 4: Sovereign-to-bank risk – Eurozone and GIIPS banks 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable 
is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread, Δlog(Bank CDS). 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding 
sovereign’s CDS spread. All regressions control for day and bank fixed effects and bank’s own 
equity returns and include interactions of bank fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx 
EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. GIIPS is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank is domiciled in Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
or Spain, and Non-GIIPS Eurozone takes the value of one if the bank is domiciled in a Eurozone 
country, but not in one of the GIIPS countries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
the bank level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Δlog(Bank CDS) 
Total 
(1/2009 – 
6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 
4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 
5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 
12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 
6/2017) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
GIIPS *  
    Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.101*** 
(0.030) 
0.033 
(0.043) 
0.040 
(0.029) 
Non-GIIPS Eurozone * 
    Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.053*** 
(0.014) 
-0.064 
(0.043) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
Control for equity returns YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 67,489 9,966 32,520 13,099 11,904 
No of banks 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.477 0.513 0.385 0.422 
 
Results suggest that only banks from countries in the monetary union were affected by the 
sovereign-bank feedback loop in the first place. In both Eurozone sub-samples, the effect is also 
economically more important than for the total-country sample. Controlling for equity returns, 
a 10 percent increase in sovereign spreads increases bank CDS spreads by 1.0 percent for banks 
from GIIPS countries and 0.53 percent for other Eurozone banks during period 2. The result for 
the sample as a whole was an increase of 0.36 percent. I conclude that the GIIPS-countries most 
likely drive the previous results in Table 3. This is in line with Acharya et al. (2014) who also 
find that the sovereign-bank feedback loop is stronger for countries in the monetary union. 
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5.1.2 Channels of sovereign-bank risk transmission 
To get a more thorough understanding which factors expose banks to sovereign risk, I test 
Hypothesis 2 by including a set of interactions between Δlog(Sovereign CDS) and different 
dummy variables in the regression models. I run the regression model (10) on the total bank 
CDS sample and for the four sub-periods. Results for the total sample are presented in Table 5 
and results for the sub-periods are presented in Appendix 3.  
Firstly, I test Hypothesis 2A and include variables Domestic exposure and Home share to test 
whether the bank-sovereign feedback loop is stronger for banks with higher exposure to 
domestic government bonds. Results are shown in first two columns of Table 5. Interaction 
with Domestic exposure, indicator for the share of domestic sovereign bond holdings out of 
bank’s total assets, is insignificant for the total period. Interaction with the second variable 
Home share, measuring domestic exposures out of total government bond holdings, is 
significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.029. Changes in sovereign spreads 
significantly affect only those banks that have comparably high holdings of domestic bonds to 
total sovereign bond holdings. The effect is insignificant for other banks. When the same 
relation is observed for different sub-periods in Appendix 3, it can be seen that both interactions 
on Domestic exposure and Home bias are statistically significant during period 2. During the 
second period, exposure to changes in sovereign spreads is more than two-times higher for 
banks that hold a high amount of assets in domestic debt. For other periods, the interactions are 
insignificant.  
Based on the results, I do not reject H2A, and conclude that banks’ bond holdings have been an 
important channel of sovereign-to-bank risk transmission, but the relation has meaningfully 
decreased since the introduction of the BRRD and the SRM. It is not theoretically clear whether 
the new regulation has aimed at breaking the asset holdings channel, since it has not introduced 
new rules regarding holdings of sovereign debt, only regarding treatment of bank failures. An 
alternative explanation for the decreased importance of sovereign bond holdings channel may 
be due to a significant decrease in the credit spreads of European government bonds have after 
period 2, which can make domestic exposures less of an issue for banks, at least temporarily. 
As risky countries’ debt has yielded less than before, decrease in credit spreads may also have 
decreased the profitability of the so-called “carry trade in peripheral bonds” (Acharya et al., 
2015; Andreeva and Vlassopoulos, 2016). However, my results do signal that domestic bond 
holdings have been an important channel of sovereign credit risk in the past. 
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I test Hypothesis 2B on the government guarantee channel by including two interaction 
variables. Firstly, variable Ratings uplift measures the difference between Moody’s the bank’s 
Issuer Credit Rating and its Baseline Credit Assessment rating and hence serves as a proxy for 
the value of government support (as assessed by the rating agency). Secondly, interaction term 
with variable Systemic importance tests whether the effects are stronger for banks with a global 
systematically important bank -status. Results are presented in columns three and four. 
Interaction between Ratings uplift and Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is significant at the 1% level with 
a coefficient of 0.017. Including the interaction makes the main effect insignificant, which 
indicates that only those banks whose Moody’s Issuer rating includes expectations of state 
support are significantly affected by changes in sovereign credit spreads. This result is as 
expected and shows support for Hypothesis 2B. In addition, the result may signal of two things. 
It may show that the rating agency Moody’s has been able to correctly analyze the likelihood 
and importance of government support in line with market expectations, or that investors have 
included regarded the Moody’s credit assessment to be valuable information and priced it in 
banks’ credit spreads. If the latter is true and these ratings actually bring new information to 
markets, then movements in sovereign spreads may actually only affect those banks which 
Moody’s expects to receive state support, because investors expect that only those banks’ credit 
spreads should be affected.  
To verify the previous results, I analyze results with the second variable Systemic Importance, 
which takes the value of one if the bank is identified to be a Global Systemically Important 
Bank (G-SIB). The variable also controls for effects of bank size, as banks deemed to be of 
systemic importance are usually the largest banks as measured by assets and the most 
international. I expect G-SIBs to be more affected by sovereign spreads, as these banks are the 
most likely ones to be supported by the state to avoid a banking crisis. Interaction between the 
sovereign CDS change and dummy Systemic importance is also statistically significant with a 
coefficient of 0.030. As expected, spreads of systemically important, large banks are more 
affected by changes to sovereign spreads. In addition, periodical results in Appendix 3 show 
that systemically important banks are the only ones that are continuously affected by sovereign 
spreads from period 1 to period 3. In this aspect, they differ from other financials, where the 
effect disappears before period 3. It seems that expectations of government support continue 
for G-SIBs although the BRRD regulation is already in effect, and these expectations disappear 
only during the last period.  
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Table 5: Sovereign-to-bank risk – Channels of transmission 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS 
spread, Δlog(Bank CDS). Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. Domestic exposure 
is equal to one if the ratio of domestic bond holdings to total assets of the bank is higher than the median of the sample in a half-a-year period. Home bias is 
equal to one if the ratio of domestic bond holdings to total sovereign bond holdings is higher than the median of the sample in a half-a-year period. Ratings 
uplift is equal to one if the Moody’s BCA rating is lower than Moody’s issuer rating when ratings are assigned numerical scores. Systemic importance is equal 
to one if the bank is deemed a G-SIB institution. Rating ceiling is equal to one if the S&P long-term rating of the bank is equal to, or higher than, the rating of 
their sovereign. CDS ceiling is equal to one if the CDS spread of a bank is lower than that of their sovereign. All regressions control for day and bank fixed 
effects and include interactions of bank fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX 
volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Δlog(Bank CDS) 
Domestic 
exposure 
Home bias Ratings uplift 
Systemic  
importance 
Rating ceiling Spread ceiling 
Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
Domestic exposure * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
     
Home bias * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
    
Ratings uplift * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
  
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
   
Systemic importance *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
   
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
  
Rating ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    
0.089** 
(0.037) 
 
Spread ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
     
0.098*** 
(0.026) 
Control for equity returns YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 52,830 53,213 63,131 67,489 64,157 67,489 
No of banks 30 30 28 31 31 31 
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.493 0.487 0.457 0.496 0.457 
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Hypothesis 2B cannot be rejected based on the analysis, and I conclude that banks which are 
more likely to enjoy government guarantees are more affected by changes in sovereign credit 
premiums. Nonetheless, the results also show that systemically important banks may differ 
from other banks with regards to regulatory changes, as the BRRD did not succeed in removing 
the credit risk transfer from sovereigns to banks for the largest financial institutions. The BRRD 
requires a “bail-in” of creditor funds instead of taxpayer money in order to save banks. 
However, the fact that systemically important banks are so large and important may have led 
investors to conclude that if they were to end up insolvent, bailing in investor money may not 
be enough to save the institution, and government support would be needed over and above the 
bail-in mechanism. 
Hypothesis 2C predicts that the feedback loop is stronger for banks that have a credit rating 
closer to the rating of their government, because of an empirically observed credit rating ceiling 
(Alsakka et al., 2014). I test the hypothesis by interacting two variables with the change in 
sovereign CDS spread. Both variables Rating ceiling and Spread ceiling measure whether the 
creditworthiness of the bank is higher than that of the sovereign, and on that account the banks’ 
credit spreads may be “bound” by the level of sovereign credit spreads. Results are shown in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. Interaction with Rating ceiling is significant at the 5% level. Banks 
with a credit rating equal to, or above, their sovereign’s credit rating are more affected than 
others by changes in sovereign’s CDS spreads. The effect is also economically clear: a 10% 
increase in sovereign spreads increase bank spreads by 0.89 percent for banks with a rating at 
the sovereign bound but only 0.09 percent for other banks. The effect for non-bound’ banks 
stays statistically significant as well.  
The alternative dummy variable Spread ceiling measures the proximity of sovereign and bank 
credit qualities using CDS spread levels. Regression results in column 6 confirm findings with 
the first variable. The interaction is statistically significant at the 1% level and coefficient on 
the interaction is 0.98 percent, even higher than coefficient on Rating ceiling. From Appendix 
3 it can be observed that both variables are significant determinants of the sovereign-to-bank 
risk transfer during the first two periods, but the significance disappears in the third period. I 
conclude that Hypothesis 2C cannot be rejected and banks which are rated above or at the same 
level as their government are more affected by changes in the sovereigns’ CDS spreads. The 
same holds when credit quality is measured with the level of the CDS spread itself. These results 
are in line with Alsakka et al. (2014) who find strong evidence supporting the existence of the 
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credit rating ceiling and many other studies on the importance of sovereign credit ratings. If the 
coefficients of different tests in Table 5 are compared with each other, it also seems that 
empirically the credit rating channel is the strongest determinant of the sovereign-to-bank risk 
transfer with a percentage increase in sovereign spreads leading to an increase of 9.8 basis 
points for banks whose CDS spread is lower than the sovereign CDS spread. 
In addition to H1, I find support for all three sub-hypotheses of H2 on the asset-holdings 
channel, guarantee channel and credit rating channel. Significance of the results diminishes 
for almost all of the variables after the second period, which is in line with previous results in 
Table 3. Results for both H1 and H2 support my expectations that the introduced regulation has 
been able to decrease linkages between banks and sovereigns, and there are no sub-groups of 
banks that would be affected by sovereign credit spreads for the whole study period. 
In general, results for the transmission channels are also consistent with previous research by 
De Bruyckere et al. (2013), Alsakka et al. (2014) and Altavilla et al. (2016), although the 
research methods of previous studies differ somewhat from my tests. In my tests the empirical 
evidence for asset-holdings channel is actually the weakest of all tested variables. De Bruyckere 
et al. (2013) found support for the asset holdings channel, guarantee channel and collateral 
channel by studying excess correlations between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, but their 
period of study is restricted to years between 2007 and 2012. Also Altavilla et al. (2017) found 
that a 10 % quarterly change in sovereign spreads translates to a 3.1 % change in bank spreads 
in GIIPS countries, for those banks that hold large amounts of sovereign bonds, which is a much 
larger magnitude than in my study. Differences in magnitude may be partly related to my longer 
dataset, daily-level regressions and unavailability of public micro-level bond holdings data. 
Either way, the results show that the detrimental effect of domestic bond holdings, at least when 
it comes to the interdependence of credit spreads, has clearly decreased in the past few years. 
Almost all results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 support Hypothesis 1 and show a weakening correlation 
between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. The tests do not prove that this weakening trend has 
been caused by the regulatory improvements, but controls for market movements and day and 
bank fixed effects make it unlikely that the decrease could be caused by a change in macro 
variables. In addition, proxy variables for expected government support, Ratings Uplift and 
Systemic Importance, lose their impact as a channel of sovereign stress after 2016 when the 
SRM came into force in the monetary union. This gives further support for the success of the 
banking union. I discuss the policy implications of my findings further in Chapter 5.5 
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5.2 Credit risk transfer from sovereigns to non-financial CDS spreads 
Next, I move to study my second research question on the relation between non-financial 
companies and sovereigns. I test hypotheses 3 and 4 with three different model specifications 
for the four sub-periods. I do not expect that the introduced banking regulation should have a 
meaningful impact on non-financial companies’ CDS premiums and I am mainly interested in 
testing the effects for the total period. Nonetheless, differences between the sub-periods are still 
of interest, because they can reveal information whether the correlation has been caused by 
special circumstances or if effects are consistent across time. I am also interested in comparing 
the results to the bank sample. I first focus on testing the transfer of sovereign risk to non-
financial firms and then move on to test the transfer channels hypothesized in H4. 
5.2.1 Corporate and sovereign credit spreads 
Firstly, Figure 6 presents correlations between sovereign CDS spreads and non-financial 
sectors’ CDS spreads by country in the four periods. Correlations are lower than in the financial 
sector for some countries, but in general the coefficients range between 0.6 and 0.8 during the 
first two periods. Again, the figure shows an interesting change in the correlations during third 
period as the correlation between CDS spreads turns negative during in several countries.  
 
Figure 6: Correlations between non-financial firm and sovereign spreads 
This figure shows the pairwise correlations between sovereign CDS spreads and the median CDS spreads for the 
country’s non-financial firms. Period 1 in blue ranges from 1.1.2009 to 11.4.2010, Period 2 in light grey from 
12.4.2010 to 11.4.2014, Period 3 in dark grey from 12.4.2014 to 31.12.2015 and Period 4 in dashed from 1.1.2016 
until 30.6.2017. Source: Datastream.  
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However, the correlation pattern for non-financials and sovereigns is a bit less consistent than 
for the banking sector. There are clear differences between countries and average correlation 
between sovereign and non-financial credit premiums range from 0.53 in Austria to 0.95 in 
Portugal. In most countries, correlations seem to be decreasing towards the end of the sample. 
Regression results for models (7), (8) and (9) are presented in Table 6. From the results of first 
two model specifications it can be seen that Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is significant at least at the 
5% level for the total sample and for all sub-periods except for period 4. A 10 % increase in 
sovereign CDS spread increases log corporate CDS spreads on average by 7 basis points 
controlling for firm fixed effects. During period 2 the economic effect doubles to a change of 
14 basis points for a 10 % change in sovereign spreads. As with the financial sample, including 
firm fixed effects and control variables increases the adjusted R2 of the regressions, but has no 
significant effect on the magnitude of results. 
Specification marked with (3) shows that adding firm’s own equity returns does not change the 
results on the main dependent variable, but the coefficient on Δlog(EQ) is highly statistically 
significant in all periods. Thus, an increase in the firm’s equity price is negatively correlated 
with a change in company’s credit spreads. This is an expected result in line with the bank 
sample and the effect is economically significant as well: a 10 percent increase in the stock 
price decreases CDS spreads by 0.82 percent, on average. It is interesting to note that the 
significance of the main dependent variable is actually higher for the non-financial sample than 
for the bank sample for most sub-periods, although coefficients are lower and the sample is 
bigger. 
Results in Table 6 support H3 and show that CDS spreads of non-financial companies are 
affected by changes in sovereign CDS premiums. Again, the results are clearly strongest both 
economically and statistically during period 2 from 2010 to 2014. Consistent with the bank 
sample, the relation has been diminishing in the last few years and the magnitude of results is 
lower than for the sample of financials. For this reason, I also conduct the tests at annual level. 
Results are presented in Appendix 4. The risk transfer to non-financials is significant only 
during three years (2011, 2012 and 2014) when the regressions are conducted in calendar years, 
indicating that the relation between non-financials and sovereigns is not as consistent as it is 
for banks. However, it is interesting to remark that the years when the relation is significant are 
different for the banks and for the non-financial firms.
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Table 6: Sovereign-to-corporate risk transfer 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regressions between where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a non-financial company’s 
CDS spread, Δlog(Firm CDS). Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread, and Δlog(EQ) is the daily change in 
the natural logarithm of the company’s equity price. All regressions control for day fixed effects. Regression specifications (2) and (3) include firm fixed effects and their interactions 
with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the company 
level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
  
Total 
(1/2009 – 6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 6/2017) 
Δlog 
(Firm CDS) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Δlog 
(Sovereign CDS) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Δlog(EQ)   
-0.082*** 
(0.009) 
  -0.047*** 
(0.009) 
  -0.104*** 
(0.014) 
  -0.092*** 
(0.018) 
  -0.073*** 
(0.013) 
Control variables NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 245,920 245,920 245,920 36,531 36,531 36,531 118,311 118,311 118,311 47,686 47,686 47,686 43,392 43,392 43,392 
No of firms 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.375 0.378 0.302 0.321 0.322 0.370 0.402 0.405 0.285 0.327 0.330 0.409 0.467 0.469 
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Augustin et al. (2016) document a higher correlation between sovereign and corporate spreads 
for companies from Eurozone and GIIPS countries. Like with the financial sample before, I add 
interactions with indicator variables for GIIPS and for Non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. Results 
presented in Table 7 show that firms from GIIPS and Eurozone countries are significantly more 
affected than others. Spreads of firms from GIIPS countries have a stronger correlation with 
changes in sovereign spreads in all periods except for period 4, where the relation is statistically 
insignificant for all samples. Firms from other Eurozone countries (excluding GIIPS countries) 
are also more affected than non-Eurozone firms, although only in the first two periods. I 
conclude that firms outside Eurozone are not affected by changes in their sovereign’s CDS 
spreads, as coefficient of the main dependent variable becomes insignificant in all periods. 
Companies from GIIPS countries are most highly affected, which may result either from the 
fact that the spreads of GIIPS governments were generally higher and the countries were more 
indebted, or from the fact that the effect was channeled through these countries’ more distressed 
banking sectors to the real economy.  
The findings are in line with Augustin et al. (2016), who present two arguments for their results. 
Firstly, they focus on the bailout of Greece, which the researchers claim increased the 
probability of future bailouts and consequently increased the riskiness of the Eurozone 
economies. This short time period may be one reason why GIIPS countries were more affected 
than others in their study, as market participants updated their beliefs of further bailouts in other 
peripheral countries. Secondly, they suggest that because countries which adopted the Euro are 
not able to use monetary policy to increase their competitiveness, the common currency may 
affect the local companies’ competitive environment through price levels.  
I am not able to reject H3 and my results support the expected relationship that sovereign CDS 
spreads affect non-financial corporates’ CDS spreads in Europe. However, results for the non-
financial sample differ from the bank sample in a few ways. Although effects are statistically 
significant, they are on average economically smaller than for financials. Also, for the bank 
sample the effect between sovereigns disappears during the third period, while it stays 
significant for the non-financial sample until period 4. This finding confirms the credibility of 
the bank sample results by showing that no specific changes in the CDS markets during the 
third period should have biased the results for the financials, as this sort of events should be 
showing in the results with the non-financial sample as well.  
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Table 7: Sovereign to corporate risk – GIIPS and Eurozone firms 
 
The results are mostly in line with previous studies. Bedendo and Colla (2015) and Augustin et 
al. (2016) show that an increase in sovereign credit spreads is associated with an increase in 
firm credit spreads, but my results are again of a lower in than previous studies. Bedendo and 
Colla (2015) find that a 10 % increase in sovereign spreads translates into a 0.5 to 0.8 percent 
increase in non-financials’ spreads, and Augustin et al. (2016) find an increase of a 1.1 percent, 
on average. However, it is important to note the short study periods of the previous studies. 
Especially Augustin et al. (2016) focus on a very narrow period during the first Greek bailout, 
which significantly spilled over from sovereign to corporate credit risk. I extend previous 
literature by showing that the risk transfer is present for a longer period and does not relate 
solely to stress transmission during crisis periods. Hence, sovereign credit risk affects corporate 
credit premiums, although the daily effects of changes in government credit risk are small.  
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of a firm’s CDS spread, Δlog(Firm CDS). Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. All regressions control for day 
and firm fixed effects and firm’s own equity returns, and include interactions of firm fixed effects with the 
daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. 
GIIPS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank is domiciled in Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
or Spain, and Non-GIIPS Eurozone takes the value of one if the bank is domiciled in a Eurozone country but 
not in one of the GIIPS countries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included 
in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Δlog(Firm CDS) 
Total 
(1/2009 – 
6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 
4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 
5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 
12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 
6/2017) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
GIIPS *  
    Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.070*** 
(0.013) 
0.193*** 
(0.025) 
0.087*** 
(0.026) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
Non-GIIPS Eurozone *  
     Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Control for equity returns YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 245,920 36,531 118,311 47,686 43,392 
No of firms 113 113 113 113 113 
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.323 0.411 0.332 0.469 
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5.2.2 Channels of transmission for non-financial firms 
Next, I test Hypothesis 4 and its sub-hypotheses by including a set of dummy variables to test 
the channels of transmission between non-financial companies and sovereigns. Results are 
presented in Table 8 for the total time period and in Appendix 5 for the sub-periods.  
First, I test whether companies that are more dependent on the banking sector and bank loans 
are more affected by sovereign risk than others. Previous results in Table 6 signaled that the 
relation between corporates and sovereigns has decreased after the banking union has been set 
up. One possible reason for the decrease in co-movement could be that the sovereign-to-firm 
credit risk spillover has effectually been caused by the bank-sovereign feedback loop, which 
has also disappeared in the past few years. For example, firms’ credit risk may have been 
affected due to a weakening financial sector in the country. To formally test the bank channel, 
I include variables Bank dependent and Bank based in the analyses. Results are shown in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 8. Interaction between variable Bank dependent, which indicates how 
large a share of firm’s debt is bank loans, and the change in sovereign spread is significant at 
the 5% level. Companies that finance a comparably large fraction of their assets with bank loans 
are more affected than others by changes in sovereign CDS. In addition, I include variable Bank 
based which is an indicator for the relative size of the country’s banking sector compared to its 
equity market capitalization. Interaction with the alternative variable is also significant at the 
5% level is significant in all of the specified sub-periods in Appendix 5. However, including 
neither of the bank-variables makes the main effect insignificant.  
Based on this evidence I cannot reject Hypothesis 4A. The results are consistent with Bedendo 
and Colla (2015) who find that companies relying more on bank financing are adversely 
affected by sovereign spread changes. My findings support the original hypothesis and show 
that firms which fund a larger fraction of their assets with bank loans or operate in countries 
with relatively large banking sectors are more affected by changes in sovereign spreads. The 
finding also indicates that the relationship between bank and sovereign spreads could leak out 
to non-financial spreads, as discussed. In addition, from Appendix 5 it can be seen that the 
transfer of credit risk from sovereigns to firms continues in the countries with comparably large 
financial sectors through the whole period from 2009 to 2017. Countries that stay in this group 
throughout the period include, for example, Austria, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden. 
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Table 8: Sovereign to corporate risk – Channels of transmission 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread. Δlog(Sovereign 
CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. Bank dependent equals one if the company’s ratio of bank loans to total liabilities is 
higher than sample median. Bank based takes the value of one if the banking assets to equity market capitalization of the country is higher than all countries’ median. Govt control is 
equal to one if the local government owns more than 5% of the company’s shares. Strategic importance is equal to one if the ratio of the company’s market capitalization to the total 
market capitalization of the country’s stock exchange is higher than of the 75th percentile of the total sample. Supported sector takes the value of one if the firm operates in utilities, 
telecommunications or transportation. Rating ceiling is equal to one if the S&P long-term rating of the bank is equal to, or higher than, the rating of their sovereign. CDS ceiling is 
equal to one if the CDS spread of a bank is lower than that of their sovereign. Domestic revenue equals one if the company’s ratio of sales from domicile country to total sales is higher 
than sample median. All regressions control for day and firm fixed effects and include interactions of firm fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade 
index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
Δlog(Firm CDS) 
Bank -
dependent 
Bank-based 
Government 
control 
Strategic 
importance 
Supported 
sector 
Rating  
ceiling 
CDS 
ceiling 
Domestic 
revenue 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Bank dependent *  
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
       
Bank based * 
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
      
Government control * 
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
  
0.015** 
(0.006) 
     
Strategic importance * 
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
   
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
    
Supported sector *  
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    
0.023** 
(0.009) 
   
Rating ceiling *  
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
     
0.073 
(0.045) 
  
CDS ceiling * 
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
      
0.058*** 
(0.016) 
 
Domestic revenue * 
    Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
       
0.018* 
(0.009) 
Control for equity return YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 149,452 245,920 245,920 224,756 243,743 217,750 245,920 243,743 
Companies 80 113 113 107 112 98 113 83 
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.378 0.378 0.388 0.378 0.382 0.378 0.378 
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Hypothesis 4B predicts that the link between sovereigns and corporates is stronger for firms 
that are more likely to benefit from government guarantees. Variable Government control that 
measures government ownership is included in column 3. Interaction with Government control 
is significant at the 5% level and the main dependent variable stays statistically significant after 
the interaction term is included. However, the coefficient for companies (partly) controlled by 
the government is higher than for other companies. On average, a 10% daily increase in 
sovereign spreads increases corporate spreads by 0.04% while the effect is 0.15% for companies 
with government ownership. Alternatively, I use two variables that measure likelihood of 
government support in other ways than direct ownership. I expect that companies which are 
more relevant to their local country in terms of market capitalization are more likely to receive 
government support. Results for including the variable Strategic relevance are presented in 
column 4. The interaction is highly statistically significant at the 1% level and the coefficient 
of 0.024 is clearly higher than for the sample in general. Hence, companies that represent a high 
part of their country’s equity market capitalization are more likely to be affected by changes in 
sovereign creditworthiness. Companies operating in utilities, transportation or 
telecommunications are also significantly more affected by sovereign spreads than others as the 
coefficient on the interaction with variable Supported sector in column 6 shows.  
Results are similar to those found by Bedendo and Colla (2015), who prove that companies 
which are supported by the state are more affected by changes in sovereign credit risk, and 
Klein and Stellner (2014) who show that bond yields of government-owned companies are 
influenced by spreads of sovereign bonds. I prove that government ownership is only one 
aspect. The results show that firms large by size compared to their home markets or operating 
in sectors that are often supported by the state, are actually more affected by changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads than government-owned companies. All in all, results for these three 
variables support Hypothesis 4B and companies which are more likely supported by local 
government are more affected by changes in its CDS spreads. Although the variables are 
defined differently, the results are also in line with the financial sample. 
Results for Hypothesis 4C are presented in columns 6 and 7. I include interactions with 
variables Rating ceiling and Spread ceiling. Coefficient on Rating ceiling is statistically 
insignificant while interaction with Spread ceiling is significant at the 1% level. The results are 
somewhat mixed: companies with a credit rating above their sovereign’s rating are not 
significantly more affected by changes in sovereign spreads than others, but companies with a 
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credit spread below their sovereigns’ are. Although insignificant, the coefficient on Rating 
ceiling is clearly higher than on Spread ceiling and the sample in general.  Periodical results in 
Appendix 4 show that the interaction with Rating ceiling is significant in regressions during 
periods 2 and 3, while Spread ceiling is significant for periods 1 and 2. During Period 2 the 
coefficient on Rating ceiling is 0.126, indicating that a ten percent increase in sovereign spread 
would increase the spread of a highly rated company 1.26%. The results support the rating 
ceiling hypothesis, although the interaction term is insignificant in the main regression model, 
consistent with the financial sample where I found strongest evidence for the ratings channel. 
In very recent studies for example Almeida et al. (2017) and Drago and Gallo (2017) have found 
empirical evidence that sovereign credit ratings affect corporate borrowing costs. 
Finally, I test Hypothesis 4D and the effect for companies that source a high portion of their 
revenue from the domestic market. Results in column 8 show that interaction with variable that 
measures the relative proportion of revenues that the firm sources from the domestic markets, 
Domestic revenue, is slightly significant at the 10% level. From Appendix 4 it can be seen that 
the interaction is significant only during period 2. The results show some support to hypothesis 
4D and the expectation that companies focused in the domestic markets are more influenced by 
sovereign credit risk, but the results are not conclusive. 
In general, regressions for different sub-periods in Appendix 4 show the same pattern as Table 
6. Almost all variables except for firm’s own equity returns lose their explanatory power over 
changes in corporate credit spreads during period 4, while the relation is clearly highest during 
the second period. In conclusion, the results support Hypothesis 4 and show that there are 
factors that make firms more vulnerable to country risk in the long-term although the results 
become mixed towards the end of the study period. Sub-hypotheses on the bank channel, 
guarantee channel and credit rating channel are supported empirically, while the proof for 
hypothesis on the domestic demand channel is weaker. This shows that the effects found by 
previous studies (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Augustin et al., 2016) are not only related to short 
crisis periods. The results are also largely in line with those of the bank sample, supporting both 
the effect of credit ratings and government guarantees on corporate credit spread changes. In 
addition, it is a bit unexpected, yet not against hypotheses, that many variables lose their 
statistical significance in explaining sovereign-to-firm risk transfer during period 3 also in the 
non-financial sample. 
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5.3 Corporate to sovereign credit risk transfer 
Finally, I investigate the reverse relation from changes in corporate spreads to changes in 
sovereign spreads to test whether a two-way dynamic between the credit spreads exists. Results 
for regression model (12) are presented in Table 9. Panel A shows results for regressing 
sovereign credit spread changes on bank spread changes, Panel B shows results for non-
financials’ spreads and Panel C shows regressions where both variables Δlog(BankRisk) and 
Δlog(FirmRisk) are included in the same model. The regressions control for changes in the local 
currency exchange rate against the US dollar, changes in the domestic equity market index and 
in 5-year US Treasury yields, in addition to corporate CDS spreads and market volatility 
From Panel 1 it can be seen that changes in bank spreads affect sovereign spreads at the 1% 
significance level during period 2 with a coefficient of 0.166. In other periods the variable is 
insignificant. In Panel B, changes in non-financial firms’ credit spreads affect sovereign spreads 
in periods 2 and 3, and significantly also for the total time sample. Coefficients are higher than 
in the previous tests – for example, a 10% change in the CDS index for non-financials increases 
log sovereign CDS spreads by 1.94%. In Panel C, the results do not change meaningfully when 
both variables are included in the regression at the same time. To save space, coefficients for 
most control variables are not presented, but daily changes in the iTraxx Main CDS index, 
volatility and US treasury yields are strongly significant determinants of changes in sovereign 
CDS spread for most countries. This is in line with Longstaff et al. (2011) and Dieckmann and 
Plank (2012) who find that global variables are important determinants of variation in sovereign 
spreads. 
Results support Hypothesis 5. Sovereign CDS spreads are clearly affected by changes in local 
banks’ and firms’ CDS spreads and the results are economically meaningful as well. 
Furthermore, the results also show support Hypothesis 1 – there is no significant covariation 
between banks and sovereigns after period 2 and the co-variation decreases between sovereigns 
and non-financial companies as well.  
In contrast to my findings, Banerjee et al. (2016) find that sovereign spreads affect bank spreads 
in long and short run but bank credit spreads stop affecting sovereign CDS spreads after the 
first Greek bailout. I find that bank spreads affect sovereign spreads also after the Greek bailout 
until spring 2014. To my knowledge, no studies have previously documented a long-term risk 
transfer from the corporate sector to sovereigns or studied how the relation has changed after   
68 
 
  
 
Table 9: Credit risk transfer from corporates to sovereigns 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of a sovereign CDS spread, Δlog(SovereignCDS). Δlog(BankRisk) is the daily 
logarithmic change in the weighted average bank CDS-spread of banks from country j, where each observation 
is weighted according total assets. Δlog(FirmRisk) is the daily logarithmic change in the weighted average non-
financial CDS-spread of firms from country j, where each observation is weighted according total assets. 
Δlog(EquityMarket) is the daily logarithmic change in local equity market index and Δlog(FXRate) is the daily 
logarithmic change in the exchange rate against US dollar. Debt-to-GDP is the ratio of the country’s sovereign 
debt to GDP. All regressions control for day and country fixed effects and include interactions of country fixed 
effects with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index, daily change in the VSTOXX volatility 
index and daily change in 5-year US Treasury yields. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants 
are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Δlog(SovereignCDS) Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Panel A: Banks to sovereigns           
Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.054 
(0.039) 
0.044 
(0.033) 
0.166*** 
(0.039) 
-0.083 
(0.088) 
0.049 
(0.034) 
Δlog(EquityMarket) 
-0.103 
(0.117) 
0.039 
(0.106) 
-0.108 
(0.100) 
-0.357 
(0.236) 
-0.156 
(0.175) 
Δlog(FXRate) 
-0.648*** 
(0.072) 
-0.027* 
(0.124) 
-0.855** 
(0.397) 
-0.530 
(0.787) 
-1.236 
(0.739) 
Debt-to-GDP 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.0186) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.023) 
Observations 23,856 3,473 11,517 4,642 4,224 
Countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.605 0.376 0.035 0.081 
Panel B: Non-financials to sovereigns         
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
0.147*** 
(0.047) 
0.042 
(0.040) 
0.194*** 
(0.058) 
0.126* 
(0.059) 
0.159 
(0.108) 
Δlog(EquityMarket) 
-0.169 
(0.109) 
0.010 
(0.088) 
-0.243** 
(0.108) 
-0.324* 
(0.159) 
-0.102 
(0.162) 
Δlog(FXRate) 
-0.474** 
(0.157) 
-0.233** 
(0.099) 
-0.609 
(0.348) 
-0.286 
(0.475) 
-0.958 
(0.611) 
Debt-to-GDP 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
Observations 28,208 4,119 13,611 5,486 4,992 
No of countries 13 13 13 13 13 
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.583 0.382 0.054 0.080 
Panel C: Non-financials and banks to sovereigns    
Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.055 
(0.058) 
0.051 
(0.039) 
0.165*** 
(0.049) 
-0.165 
(0.174) 
0.010 
(0.057) 
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
0.129*** 
(0.036) 
0.008 
(0.045) 
0.161*** 
(0.045) 
0.115 
(0.083) 
0.242 
(0.149) 
Equity market, FX rate,  
Debt-to-GDP 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,680 3,150 10,470 4,220 3,840 
No of countries 10 10 10 10 10 
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.607 0.378 0.028 0.070 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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local bailouts of the banking sector have been prohibited in the EU. Furthermore, my results 
shed light on the corporate-to-sovereign transfer by showing that it is not only the local banking 
sector, but also the credit risk of non-financial firms’ that may affect sovereign 
creditworthiness. These results cannot be explained only with government guarantees, as 
compared to banks, normal firms are less likely to be explicitly supported by the state. Although 
I control for changes in several global and local market variables, some part of the co-movement 
may be related to unobserved variables in the local economy that affect both corporate and 
sovereign credit risk. 
Finally, I test if GIIPS and Eurozone countries differ from those that do not belong to the 
monetary union. Results are presented in Table 10. The transmission effects are strongest for 
GIIPS countries and insignificant for countries outside Eurozone. Non-GIIPS countries in the 
Eurozone are, however, also significantly affected by changes in corporate spreads. Panel A of 
Table 10 actually shows that the CDS spreads of banks in the Eurozone significantly affect 
sovereign spreads in the last sub-period showing some evidence against the hypothesis that the 
new regulation has broken the bank-sovereign feedback loop. The same relation is not seen 
with GIIPS countries. In conclusion, results in Table 10 are in line with previous evidence. 
From Panel B it can be observed that corporate-to-sovereign feedback loop is not present in 
countries outside of Eurozone. In the monetary union the relation is significant, both from firms 
to sovereigns and from sovereigns to firms. This finding is also consistent with Dieckmann and 
Plank (2012) who find that CDS spreads of countries within the Eurozone exhibit higher 
sensitivity to the state of the financial sector. Generally, results in all tests which divide the 
sample into Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries show that only firms and banks within the 
monetary union are affected by changes in the credit quality of their sovereign. 
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Table 10: Sovereign credit risk – GIIPS and Eurozone countries 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily change 
in the natural logarithm of a sovereign CDS spread, Δlog(SovereignCDS). Δlog(BankRisk) is the daily logarithmic 
change in the weighted average bank CDS-spread of banks from country j, where each observation is weighted 
according total assets. Δlog(FirmRisk) is the daily logarithmic change in the weighted average non-financial 
CDS-spread of firms from country j, where each observation is weighted according total assets. GIIPS is an 
indicator variable that takes the value for countries Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain, and Non-GIIPS Eurozone 
for countries in the Eurozone, excluding the GIIPS countries. All regressions control for day and country fixed 
effects and changes in the local equity market index, foreign exchange rate against the US dollar and the country’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio. All regressions include interactions of country fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx 
EUR Investment Grade index, daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index and daily change in 5-year US 
Treasury yields, Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions 
but not shown in the table. 
 
Δlog(SovereignCDS) Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Panel A: Banks to sovereigns         
Δlog(BankRisk) 
-0.020  
(0.045) 
0.034 
(0.043) 
0.046 
(0.048) 
-0.039 
(0.138) 
-0.088 
(0.075) 
GIIPS * Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.113 
(0.063) 
0.049 
(0.064) 
0.249*** 
(0.069) 
0.029 
(0.062) 
0.078 
(0.097) 
Non-GIIPS Eurozone * 
Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.020 
(0.061) 
0.044 
(0.032) 
0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.326** 
(0.143) 
0.153** 
(0.053) 
Observations 23,856 3,473 11,517 4,642 4,224 
No of countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.605 0.377 0.043 0.082 
Panel B: Non-financials to sovereigns         
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
-0.004 
(0.050) 
-0.050 
(0.031) 
0.019 
(0.040) 
-0.184* 
(0.097) 
0.223 
(0.234) 
GIIPS * Δlog(FirmRisk)  
0.248*** 
(0.034) 
0.130** 
(0.053) 
0.315*** 
(0.054) 
0.298*** 
(0.048) 
0.089 
(0.084) 
Non-GIIPS Eurozone * 
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
0.117** 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.043) 
0.131** 
(0.051) 
0.067 
(0.063) 
0.190 
(0.137) 
Observations 28,208 4,119 13,611 5,486 4,992 
No of countries 13 13 13 13 13 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.584 0.385 0.057 0.080 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
71 
 
  
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
To ensure the robustness of my empirical results, I conduct additional statistical tests. Like 
discussed previously, daily quotes of CDS spreads may be noisy because contracts on corporate 
entities can be illiquid. In this study, I decided to follow Acharya et al. (2014) and several others 
in the main models and use daily data. However, I also test whether the illiquidity of quotes 
affect my results and conduct the most important tests on changes of CDS spreads at the weekly 
level. The weekly CDS change is calculated as the logarithmic change of average weekly CDS 
spread of each firm and country. Results for the main regressions on weekly level are presented 
in Table 11 for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. 
The results stay mostly in line with the tests on daily data, although coefficients are distinctly 
higher. Statistical significance is mostly consistent with the previous results with the exception 
of a few periods, where coefficients become statistically significant with weekly data. Daily 
changes in CDS spreads are smaller than weekly changes, on average, and if anything using 
daily data seems to be downplaying some of the previously documented effects. A 10% weekly 
increase in sovereign CDS spreads is translated to an increase of 0.61% in bank spreads and a 
0.34% increase in non-financials’ spreads. The adjusted R2 of the models also increase with 
weekly level data, indicating that daily changes in CDS spreads do entail some noise. 
Additionally, the weekly level regressions indicate that the relation between non-financial firms 
and sovereigns persists during all periods – also during period 4 which showed no significant 
evidence with daily-level changes. Interestingly, the relation between banks and sovereigns 
becomes significant again in period 4 when tests are conducted at the week level. This is 
contrary to previous findings, where the bank-sovereign relation was insignificant in all tests 
after the second period. The results with weekly changes hint that the bank-sovereign feedback 
loop is not necessarily fully broken yet. 
I also test whether results of empirical tests change if I use a dynamic panel and include one-
day lags of the dependent variable and the main independent variable in the regression models 
(Bedendo and Colla, 2015).  Results for regression models (13) and (14) are presented in Table 
12; in Panel A for banks, in Panel B for non-financials and in Panel C for sovereigns.  
In Panels A and B, the lag of the change in sovereign spreads is significant in several sub-
periods for bank and non-financial samples. This indicates that in addition to current changes, 
previous changes in sovereign creditworthiness also have an effect on firm spreads. 
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Table 11: Weekly regressions 
 
This table presents regression results for fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable of each regression is 
indicated next to the name of the panel. Δlog(Bank CDS) is the weekly logarithmic change in a bank’s CDS 
spread, Δlog(Firm CDS) is the weekly logarithmic change in a non-financial firm’s CDS spread and 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the weekly logarithmic change in a sovereign’s CDS spread. Δlog(BankRisk) is the 
weekly logarithmic change in the weighted average bank CDS-spread in country j, where each spread is weighted 
according bank’s total assets. Δlog(FirmRisk) is the weekly logarithmic change in the weighted average non-
financial CDS-spread in country j, where each spread is weighted according to firm’s total assets. Δlog(Bank EQ) 
and Δlog(Firm EQ) are the weekly logarithmic changes in a bank’s or non-financial firm’s equity price, 
respectively. All regressions control for week and bank/firm/country fixed effects and interactions of 
bank/firm/country fixed effects with in the weekly changes isn iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and 
VSTOXX volatility index. Panel C regressions also control for weekly changes in the country’s equity market 
index, country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the change in the foreign exchange rate against the US Dollar and interaction 
of country fixed effects with the weekly change in the 5-year US Treasury yields. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Total 
(1/2009 – 
6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 
4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 
5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 
12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 
6/2017) 
Panel A: Bank risk Δlog(Bank CDS)         
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
0.030 
(0.030) 
0.080*** 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.025) 
0.104*** 
(0.030) 
Δlog(Bank EQ) 
-0.227*** 
(0.071) 
-0.321*** 
(0.086) 
-0.108 
(0.085) 
-0.133 
(0.148) 
-0.394 
(0.262) 
Observations 13,809 2,029 6,665 2,697 2,418 
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.631 0.650 0.432 0.588 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Non-financials Δlog(Firm CDS)         
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.029** 
(0.014) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
Δlog(Firm EQ) 
-0.473*** 
(0.064) 
-0.273*** 
(0.074) 
-0.551*** 
(0.115) 
-0.655*** 
(0.167) 
-0.357*** 
(0.083) 
Observations 49,935 7,375 24,080 9,744 8,736 
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.464 0.493 0.445 0.551 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel C: Sovereigns Δlog(Sovereign CDS)    
Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.113** 
(0.048) 
0.010 
(0.049) 
0.208** 
(0.068) 
0.022 
(0.065) 
0.167** 
(0.065) 
Observations 4,889 709 2,365 957 858 
Adjusted R2 0.555 0.800 0.559 0.204 0.423 
Δlog(CorpRisk) 
0.255*** 
(0.070) 
0.136*** 
(0.039) 
0.338*** 
(0.097) 
0.286** 
(0.119) 
0.144 
(0.088) 
Observations 5,781 841 2,795 1,131 1,014 
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.798 0.552 0.226 0.396 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Lags of the dependent variable are also significant for some sub-periods, but the coefficient is 
mostly negative, showing signs of reversal in daily credit spread changes – yesterday’s change 
in spreads is at least partly reversed by today’s change.  Furthermore, including lags in the 
regression models does not change the original results for banks or for non-financials. If 
anything the coefficient on variable Δlog(Sovereign CDS) becomes more significant. 
Controlling for a dynamic relationship further strengthens the previously discussed findings.  
Panel C shows results where the change in sovereign spreads is the dependent variable. The lag 
of the dependent variable Δlog(Sovereign CDS)(t-1) is significantly negative in most periods. 
Changes in sovereign spreads show clear reversal from the day before, indicating that daily 
changes in sovereign spreads may entail noise. The main effects from corporate credit risk to 
sovereign credit risk stay significant after including the lagged variables for the same periods 
as before.  
Again, it is interesting to note that during the last period from January 2016 onwards, 
Δlog(BankRisk) significantly explains variation in sovereign spreads when lagged variables are 
included in the regressions. Contrary to previous findings, it seems that bank risk again feeds 
back to sovereign risk in the period starting from 2016 – indicating that the bank-sovereign 
feedback loop is not fully broken yet. One reason behind the change in the last period could be 
fears of Deutsche Bank failure and the turbulence in the bank markets in the beginning of 2016.  
 
5.5 Discussion of results 
Next, I briefly discuss my findings combining together results for all of the three samples, my 
contribution to literature, and implications of the results to investors, policy makers and firms.  
My regression results support hypotheses 1 and 3 and show that sovereign credit spreads affect 
corporate credit spreads of both banks and firms outside the financial sector. Results are in line 
with previous literature (Acharya et al., 2014; Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Augustin et al., 2016, 
among others). As expected, the co-movement becomes insignificant for the bank sample after 
2014. For other firms the risk transfer from sovereigns has persisted longer, but the statistical 
significance has also decreased after 2016. The Bank Recovery and Resolution directive, which 
entered into force in spring 2014, forces bank creditors to take losses before taxpayers and the 
SRM of the European Banking Union has aimed to break the link between sovereigns and the 
local banking sector by centralizing the bank resolution to an EU-level.   
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Table 12: Regressions with a dynamic panel 
 
This table presents regression results for fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable of each regression is indicated next 
to the name of each panel. ΔLog(Bank CDS) is the weekly logarithmic change in a bank’s CDS spread, Δlog(Firm CDS) is the 
weekly logarithmic change in a non-financial firm’s CDS spread and Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the weekly logarithmic change 
in a sovereign’s CDS spread. ΔLog(Bank/Firm/Sovereign CDS)(t-1) is a one-day lag of the CDS spread change. Δlog(BankRisk) 
is the weekly logarithmic change in the weighted average bank CDS-spread in country j, where each spread is weighted 
according to bank’s total assets. ΔLog(FirmRisk) is the weekly logarithmic change in the weighted average non-financial CDS-
spread in country j, where each spread is weighted according to firm’s total assets. ΔLog(Bank/Firm Risk)(t-1) is a one-day lag 
of the weighted CDS spreads. All regressions control for day and bank/firm/country fixed effects and interactions of 
bank/firm/country fixed effects with in the daily changes in iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and VSTOXX volatility index. 
Panel C regressions also control for daily changes in the local equity market index, country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the change in 
the foreign exchange rate against the US Dollar and interaction of country fixed effects with the daily change in the 5-year US 
Treasury yields. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
 
Total 
(1/2009 – 
6/2017) 
Period 1 
(1/2009 – 
4/2010) 
Period 2 
(4/2010 – 
5/2014) 
Period 3 
(5/2014 – 
12/2015) 
Period 4 
(1/2016 – 
6/2017) 
Panel A: Δlog(Bank CDS)      
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.039*** 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Δlog(Bank CDS)(t-1) 
-0.053** 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(00.020) 
-0.058** 
(0.025) 
-0.043 
(0.026) 
-0.104*** 
(0.028) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS)(t-1) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Controls and equity returns YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 67,458 9,935 32,520 13,099 11,904 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.477 0.513 0.384 0.429 
Panel B: Δlog(Firm CDS)      
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Δlog(Firm CDS)(t-1) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.032** 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.044) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS)(t-1) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Controls and equity returns YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 245,807 36,418 118,311 47,686 43,392 
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.322 0.406 0.331 0.470 
Panel C: Δlog(Sovereign CDS)      
Δlog(BankRisk) 
0.067 
(0.039) 
0.042 
(0.033) 
0.172*** 
(0.041) 
-0.061 
(0.071) 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS)(t-1) 
-0.246*** 
(0.032) 
-0.044* 
(0.023) 
-0.149*** 
(0.033) 
-0.345*** 
(0.042) 
-0.325*** 
(0.030) 
Δlog(BankRisk)(t-1) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
0.013 
(0.030) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
0.028 
(0.032) 
Observations 23,845 3,462 11,517 4,642 4,224 
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.606 0.390 0.153 0.178 
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
0.169*** 
(0.051) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
0.208*** 
(0.059) 
0.164** 
(0.062) 
0.199 
(0.121) 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS)(t-1) 
-0.233*** 
(0.034) 
-0.094** 
(0.035) 
-0.129*** 
(0.040) 
-0.339*** 
(0.043) 
-0.319*** 
(0.029) 
Δlog(FirmRisk)(t-1) 
0.042** 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
0.044 
(0.034) 
0.097** 
(0.045) 
-0.030 
(0.081) 
Observations 28,195 4,106 13,611 5,486 4,992 
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.587 0.393 0.165 0.174 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Based on my empirical results, it seems that both regulatory initiatives have been successful in 
their aims, and to my knowledge, this study is the first one to document a significant decrease 
in the sovereign-to-bank risk transfer. A significant relation is found only for firms and 
sovereigns that are domiciled in the Eurozone. 
Previous empirical results of Bedendo and Colla (2015) and Augustin et al. (2016) have 
documented a similar risk transfer from sovereigns to non-financial companies within a narrow 
period after the sovereign debt crisis. I confirm the previous findings with a much longer dataset 
and show that sovereign credit risk is indeed a meaningful determinant of corporate credit 
spreads also in the long term. Furthermore, I document a two-way dynamic between corporate 
and sovereign credit spreads and find support for H5: aggregate corporate credit risk, both of 
banks’ and non-financial companies’, affects sovereign credit risk in Eurozone countries. 
Surprisingly, the effect seems to be stronger and more persistent from non-financial corporates 
than from banks. Bank-to-sovereign effects diminish after period 2014. Results are support the 
expectation that sovereigns transferred a part of the banking sector’s credit risk to their own, 
after which the expectations of bank failures have decreased (Acharya et al., 2014). Corporate-
to-sovereign risk transfer persists for a longer period and is significant for the total study period.  
Based on my empirical results, I also argue that some firms are more affected by sovereign 
spreads than others. For both samples, firms which are more likely to benefit from government 
support, and firms whose credit risk is close to the credit rating of the sovereign are more 
affected by changes in sovereign spreads, as I expected. This finding is common for both banks 
and for non-financials. In addition, banks that hold large amounts of domestic sovereign bonds 
and non-financial firms that are more dependent on bank loans are more affected than others. 
These results are also mostly consistent with discussions found in previous literature.  
The results are meaningful for several stakeholders. Firstly, investors of both corporate and 
sovereign debt should acknowledge that country risk may affect the returns of corporate bonds, 
and significant risks in the private sector may increase the risk of sovereign debt. Particularly 
those companies that may benefit from government guarantees, have a high credit rating or are 
otherwise concentrated in the local markets are likely to be influenced by changes in sovereign 
credit spreads. Hence, even investors that do not hold sovereign bonds may be suspect to the 
credit risk of European governments through their holdings of corporate debt. Secondly, an 
improvement (worsening) in the creditworthiness of the home country may decrease (increase) 
the borrowing costs of local banks and non-financials. From firm managements’ point of view, 
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it is worth to realize that even in the global financial markets country risks may affect the firm’s 
creditworthiness. Where the company is headquartered may in the best (worst) case 
significantly affect the firms’ financial costs. 
Thirdly, the results show important remarks to politicians and EU policy makers. For local 
politicians, results for H5 show that the riskiness of, and guarantees to, local private sector are 
determinants of sovereign risk. Thus, a strict discipline of public finances may decrease not 
only decrease the borrowing costs of the government, but also the borrowing costs of local 
firms, which may foster economic growth in the long term. On the other side, deterioration in 
government finances reduces the value and credibility of guarantees to the private sector and 
consequently increases firms’ credit risks and makes the likelihood of interventions higher. 
Thus, riskiness of the private sector meaningfully affects government’s borrowing costs.  
It is in the interests of politicians, taxpayers and EU policy makers to decrease the loop between 
corporate and sovereign credit risk in order to stabilize borrowing costs and to break the link 
between the banking sector and governments. My results prove that the loop has been 
diminishing in the past years and the markets seem to consider the likelihood of bank or firm 
bailouts to be much lower than before. This is good news to regulators in the European Union, 
as it shows that the new regulation on banking sector has at least partly succeeded in its aims. 
However, some of the results presented in the robustness checks indicate that the feedback-loop 
between banks and governments is not completely broken. Time will tell whether the risk loop 
will emerge again if general levels of credit risk increase, or if the new regulation is tested with 
a resolution of a large and systemic bank. It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss possible 
policy enhancements, but for example Navaretti et al. (2016) suggest that assigning a non-zero 
risk weight that reflects the effective risks of EU government bonds would cut incentives to 
support local governments. However, this improvement is not unproblematic either. Changing 
the treatment of sovereign bonds could make sourcing sovereign financing difficult for riskier 
countries and make the problem of the feedback loop even worse. 
Finally, it is important to note that although I document significant relation between of 
sovereign and corporate spreads, my results do not prove causality between the two sectors. 
This is the disadvantage of the chosen research methods: correlation between spreads and 
discussion of drivers behind the feedback loop does not necessarily mean that these factors have 
actually caused the co-movement in spreads; it only shows which firms have been more affected 
in the past compared to others. Proving a causal link is left out of the scope of this thesis. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have studied the relation between sovereign and corporate CDS spreads in 
Europe and how their interdependence has changed after the financial crisis. In particular, I 
employ a large panel dataset of CDS premiums of sovereigns, banks and non-financial 
companies from 2009 to 2017 in my tests. My research methods are able to isolate the effects 
of sovereign (or firm) credit spread changes to firm (sovereign) credit default spreads by 
controlling for market movements, day and bank fixed effects and the firm’s own equity returns 
in the regressions. I divide the sample to four sub-periods to test for changes in the relationship.  
My first research question asked has new banking sector regulation in the European Union been 
successful in breaking the previously documented relation between bank and sovereign CDS 
spreads. In line with my hypotheses, I find that there has been a significant relationship between 
banking sector and sovereign CDS spreads after the financial crisis. This is consistent with the 
results of Acharya et al. (2014), Alter and Schüler (2012) and Fratzscher and Rieth (2015).  
However, this relation has weakened to insignificant after new banking sector regulation has 
been implemented in the European Union. Both the effects from sovereigns to banks, and from 
banks to sovereigns, have decreased after 2014 when the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive came into force. Regarding the characteristics of affected banks, those that hold 
significant amounts of domestic government bonds or have a credit rating close to the credit 
rating of the sovereign are more affected by changes in sovereign CDS spreads, as well as 
systemically important financial institutions and banks that are expected to benefit explicit and 
implicit government guarantees. The findings are in line with my expectations and previous 
research (De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014), although many effects are present 
only for a period from 2011 to 2014. In general, the results are meaningful and shed light on 
the impact of new regulatory changes. To my knowledge, no studies have before documented 
the impact of the regulation on the much-studied credit risk feedback loop. 
Regarding my second research question, I also find evidence of a two-way dependence between 
credit spreads of non-financial firms and sovereigns. CDS premiums of non-financial firms are 
significantly affected by changes in sovereign spreads, and sovereigns are also meaningfully 
impacted by private sector credit risk. The results are in line with my hypothesis, and shed new 
light on a sovereign-to-corporate credit risk transfer beyond the banking sector. The findings 
also bear importance to corporate financing costs by proving that country risk can be a 
meaningful component in the costs of debt even in financially developed countries. Corporate 
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issuers in Europe should to take into account that large changes to the credit risk of the country 
they are domiciled in may affect future borrowing costs of the firm. In addition, politicians 
should acknowledge that strict fiscal policy can increase not only the government’s 
creditworthiness, but also decrease the credit spreads of local firms. Surprisingly, sovereign 
CDS premiums are more affected by corporate credit risk than the other way around.  
Previous research (Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Augustin et al., 2016) shows that shocks to 
sovereign credit risk can spill over to corporate credit risk in sovereign debt crisis through firms’ 
dependence on the banking sector, dependence on domestic demand, and decrease in the value 
of government guarantees to firms. I contribute to previous literature by showing that this 
relation is not solely linked to years of sovereign distress, but persists over an extended period 
from 2009 to 2015. I also document that firms’ relative dependence on bank loans, the 
likelihood of receiving government support, and the credit quality of firms are important 
channels through which sovereign credit risk affects corporate credit premiums. Importantly, 
both results for the banks and for the non-financials show significant relationship between 
sovereign risks only for firms from Eurozone countries. Non-Eurozone countries are unaffected 
in nearly all of tests.  
Some tests conducted in the robustness checks -section show indications that the bank-
sovereign feedback loop is not fully broken yet, as sovereign credit spreads start to significantly 
affect bank spreads again in 2016. Therefore, in the future it would be interesting to test whether 
the general results of my study persist and has the regulation has been able to break the 
sovereign-bank feedback loop for good, especially after the ECB starts to normalize its 
unconventional monetary policy. The abnormal monetary policy has kept market rates 
extremely low in the monetary union, and it would be interesting to see how bank- and 
sovereign spreads will react to future increases in the level of interest rates. In addition, it would 
be especially relevant for policy makers to see how credit spreads would react to a new crisis, 
a significant stress scenario in the markets, or the failure of a systemic financial institution. In 
addition, although the role of country risk in emerging markets has been studied before, it would 
be interesting to duplicate my findings with global data because I find significant results only 
for countries that are part of the Eurozone. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Calculation Data source 
Δlog(Bank CDS) Daily change in natural logarithm of bank's CDS spread Datastream 
Δlog(Firm CDS) Daily change in natural logarithm of non-financial's CDS spread Datastream 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) Daily change in natural logarithm of sovereign's CDS spread Datastream 
Δlog(BankRisk) 
Daily change in natural logarithm of a country-specific index of 
bank CDS spreads. The daily spread of the index is calculated as 
the weighted average of the country's banks, with total assets 
relative to other banks as weights. 
Datastrean,  
Thomson One 
Δlog(EQ) 
Daily change in natural logarithm of bank's or non-financial firm's 
equity price 
Datastream 
Δlog(EquityMarket) Daily change in natural logarithm of a country's equity index Datastream 
Δlog(FirmRisk) 
Daily change in natural logarithm of a country-specific index of 
non-financial firms' CDS spreads. The daily spread of the index is 
calculated as the weighted average of the country's firms with total 
assets relative to other non-financial firms as weights. 
Datastrean,  
Thomson One 
Δlog(FXRate) 
Daily change in the natural logarithm of the foreign exchange rate 
against US dollar 
Bloomberg 
Bank dependent 
1 if the ratio of bank debt to total liabilities of a non-financial firm 
is higher than the sample median, 0 otherwise. Re-measured 
annually. 
Orbis 
Bank-based 
1 if the country's ratio of total banking sector assets to total equity 
market capitalization is higher than the all-country median, 0 
otherwise. Re-measured annually. 
Bloomberg, ECB 
Debt-to-GDP Country's government debt to GDP ratio, measured quarterly OECD 
Domestic demand 
1 if the ratio of revenue a non-financial firm sources from the 
domestic country compared to its total revenue is higher than the 
sample median at the end of 2016, 0 otherwise 
Orbis 
Domestic exposure 
1 for banks if the ratio of domestic sovereign bond holdings to 
total assets is higher than the bank-sample median, 0 otherwise. 
Re-measured bi-annually. 
ECB Stress tests,  
Thomson One 
GIIPS 1 for firms from Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain, 0 otherwise Datastream 
Government control 
1 for non-financial firms where the domestic government holds 
more than 5% of firms outstanding shares at the end of 2016, 0 
otherwise 
Orbis 
Home share 
1 for banks if the ratio of domestic sovereign bond holdings to 
total government bond holdings is higher than the bank-sample 
median, 0 otherwise. Re-measured bi-annually. 
ECB Stress tests 
Non-GIIPS Eurozone 
1 for firms from Eurozone, but not from Ireland, Italy, Portugal or 
Spain, 0 otherwise 
Datastream 
Rating ceiling 
1 if the S&P long term issuer credit rating of the bank or firm is 
higher than, or equal to the sovereign's issuer rating, 0 otherwise 
Thomson One 
Ratings uplift 
1 if the Moody's assigned Issuer Credit Rating of a bank is higher 
than Moody's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) rating, 0 
otherwise. The difference indicates government support. 
Bloomberg 
Spread ceiling 
1 if the CDS spread the bank or firm is higher than, or equal to the 
sovereign's CDS spread, 0 otherwise 
Datastream 
Strategic importance 
1 if the ratio of non-financial firm's market capitalization to the 
total market capitalization of the domicile country is higher than 
the 75th percentile of the sample, 0 otherwise. Re-measured 
annually. 
Bloomberg 
Supported sector 
1 if the non-financial firm operates in sectors classified as 
telecommunications, utilities or transportation, 0 otherwise 
Thomson 
Systemic importance 
1 if the bank is deemed to be a Global Systemically Important 
Bank (G-SIB) by the Financial Stability Board, 0 otherwise. 
ECB Stress tests 
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Appendix 2: Annual regressions – sovereigns to banks 
  
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression, where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread. 
Δlog (Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread and Δlog(EQ) is the daily change in the natural logarithm 
of the bank’s equity price. All regressions control for day and bank fixed effects and include interactions of bank fixed effects with the logarithm of daily change in the 
iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table.  
Δlog(Bank CDS) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.044** 
(0.018) 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Δlog(EQ) 
-0.043*** 
(0.013) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
-0.060*** 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.034*** 
(0.012) 
-0.087*** 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.063*** 
(0.017) 
-0.134** 
(0.064) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,858 7,936 7,985 7,983 7,940 7,930 7,953 7,967 3,937 
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.613 0.445 0.517 0.536 0.308 0.536 0.484 0.299 
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Appendix 3: Periodic regressions on the sovereign-bank transmission channels 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread. Δlog (Sovereign CDS) 
is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. Domestic exposure is equal to one if the ratio of domestic bond holdings to total assets of the 
bank is higher than the median of the sample in a half-a-year period. Home bias is equal to one if the ratio of domestic bond holdings to total sovereign bond holdings is higher than the 
median of the sample in a half-a-year period. Systemic importance is equal to one if the bank is deemed a G-SIB. Ratings uplift is equal to one if the Moody’s BCA rating is lower than 
Moody’s issuer rating when ratings are assigned numerical scores. Rating ceiling is equal to one if the S&P long-term rating of the bank is equal to, or higher than, the rating of their 
sovereign. CDS ceiling is equal to one if the CDS spread of a bank is lower than that of their sovereign. All regressions control for day and bank fixed effects and include interactions of 
firm fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
the bank level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table.  
 
Δlog(Bank CDS) Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.025 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
Domestic exposure * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
0.061** 
(0.023) 
-0.032 
(0.041) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
        
Home share * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    0.014 
(0.025) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
    
Systemic Importance *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
        0.064*** 
(0.022) 
0.059*** 
(0.018) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Observations 1,904 29,046 12,513 9,727 1,972 29,361 12,513 9,727 9,966 32,520 13,099 11,904 
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.539 0.396 0.504 0.589 0.533 0.396 0.504 0.478 0.511 0.384 0.422 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.044 
(0.058) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.033) 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Ratings uplift *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
        
Rating ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    0.070* 
(0.036) 
0.147*** 
(0.045) 
0.072 
(0.051) 
0.035 
(0.033) 
    
Spread ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
        0.093** 
(0.045) 
0.118*** 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.058) 
0.007 
(0.046) 
Observations 9,318 30,423 12,254 11,136 9,386 31,381 12,254 11,136 9,966 32,520 13,099 11,904 
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.558 0.397 0.458 0.493 0.555 0.398 0.494 0.478 0.511 0.383 0.422 
Control for equity returns YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Appendix 4: Annual regressions – sovereigns to non-financials 
 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression, where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a firm’s CDS spread. Δlog 
(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread and Δlog(EQ) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of 
the bank’s equity price. All regressions control for day and firm fixed effects and include interactions of firm fixed effects with the logarithm of daily change in the 
iTraxx EUR Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table.  
 
Δlog(Firm CDS) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Δlog(EQ) 
-0.046*** 
(0.011) 
-0.098*** 
(0.035) 
-0.099*** 
(0.017) 
-0.125*** 
(0.027) 
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
-0.099*** 
(0.019) 
-0.087*** 
(0.023) 
-0.069*** 
(0.015) 
-0.082*** 
(0.025) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 28,847 29,154 29,041 28,928 28,815 28,815 28,928 29,041 14,351 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.500 0.423 0.353 0.361 0.300 0.334 0.478 0.435 
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Appendix 5: Periodic regressions on sovereign-corporate transmission channels 
 
This table reports regression results for fixed effects regression where the independent variable is the daily change in the natural logarithm of a bank’s CDS spread. Δlog(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change 
in the natural logarithm of the corresponding sovereign’s CDS spread. Bank dependent equals one if the company’s ratio of bank loans to total liabilities is higher than sample median. Bank based takes the 
value of one if the banking assets to equity market capitalization of the country is higher than all countries’ median. Govt control is equal to one if the local government owns more than 5% of the company’s 
shares. Strategic importance is equal to one if the ratio of the company’s market capitalization to the total market capitalization of the country’s stock exchange is higher than of the 75th percentile of the 
total sample. Supported sector takes the value of one if the firm operates in utilities, telecommunications or transportation. Rating ceiling is equal to one if the S&P long-term rating of the bank is equal to, 
or higher than, the rating of their sovereign. CDS ceiling is equal to one if the CDS spread of a bank is lower than that of their sovereign. Domestic demand equals one if the company’s ratio of sales from 
domicile country to total sales is higher than sample median. All regressions control for day and firm fixed effects and include interactions of firm fixed effects with the daily change in the iTraxx EUR 
Investment Grade index and daily change in the VSTOXX volatility index. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, correspondingly. Constants are included in the regressions but not shown in the table. 
log (Firm CDS) Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Bank dependent * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
            
Bank-based * 
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
        
Government control *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
        0.013 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
    
Strategic importance *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
            0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.044** 
(0.018) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
Observations 23,328 72,904 28,260 24,960 36,531 118,311 47,686 43,392 36,531 118,311 47,686 43,392 32,967 107,995 43,888 39,936 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.409 0.363 0.465 0.322 0.406 0.330 0.470 0.322 0.406 0.330 0.469 0.319 0.412 0.360 0.489 
Δlog(Sovereign CDS) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Supported sector*  
   Δ log(Soveregn CDS) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
            
Rating ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
    0.108 
(0.105) 
0.126** 
(0.059) 
0.088*** 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
        
Spread ceiling *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
        0.038** 
(0.015) 
0.076*** 
(0.018) 
0.037 
(0.022) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
    
Domestic demand *  
   Δ log(Sovereign CDS) 
            0.024* 
(0.013) 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Observations 36,207 117,264 47,264 43,008 32,063 103,843 41,778 37,889 36,531 118,311 47,686 43,392 36,207 117,264 47,264 43,008 
Adjusted R2 0.321 0.406 0.330 0.472 0.327 0.407 0.337 0.477 0.322 0.407 0.331 0.469 0.322 0.408 0.335 0.471 
Control for EQ returns YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
